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THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
Yitzhak Hadari*

I.

INTRODUCTION

the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, society has
experienced the persistent tendency of business organizations
to expand. Businesses evolved from the rural workshop to the urban
factory; from the municipal firm to the regional firm and then to
the national enterprise. More recently, enterprises have expanded
even further, from national firms with small export outlets to huge
multinational enterprises (MNEs) embracing business operations
all over the globe coordinated under a single management. Yet,
along with its beneficial results for the peoples of the world, each
new economic era brings with it new problems as well.
The conflict benveen the development of MNEs and the sovereign states in which they operate has generated a vast business literature1 and has also commanded the attention of legal scholars.2 This
ROM

F

• Member of Law Faculty, University of Tel Aviv. LL.B. 1966, LL.M. 1970, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem; LL.M. 1971, S.J.D. 1972, University of Michigan.-Ed.
© Copyright 19711 Yitzhak Hadari. This is the first of two Articles on multinational
enterprises. The concluding Article is still in preparation. These Articles are based on
a doctoral dissertation submitted to The University of Michigan Law School. The remainder of the dissertation deals primarily with tax issues concerning the multinational
enterprise. A small portion of the tax discussion provided the basis for an earlier Article,
Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the Financial Planning of the Multinational
Enterprise, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 111 (1972).
The author wishes to thank Professors Eric Stein and Stanley Siegel of The University of Michigan Law School for their valuable comments and assistance. The
author also wishes to thank The University of Michigan Law School for the generous
support which enabled this sllldy.
I. See, e.g., J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
(1970) [hereinafter J. BEHRMAN]; R. HELLMANN, THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. DOMINANCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (1971); C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(1969) [hereinafter C. KINDLEBERGER]; THE INTERNATIONAL CoRPORATION (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CoRPORATION]; THE MULTINATIONAL CoRPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (S. Rolfe &: w. Damm ed. 1970) (collected papers
presented at the Conference on Direct Investment in the Atlantic Area) [hereinafter
s. Rolfe &: w. Damm]; R. VERNON, SoVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971) [hereinafter R. VERNON].
2. Angelo, Multinational Corporate Enterprise, 1968-III ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES CouRS 44!1 (1970) [hereinafter Angelo]: Fatouros, The

Computer and the Mud Hut: Notes on Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries, IO CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 335 (1971) [hereinafter Fatouros]; Goldberg&: Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAw &: POLICY INTL. Bus. 295 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg &:
Kindleberger]; Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's
Analysis, !I LAW &: POLICY INTL. Bus. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Rubin]; Vagts, The Global
Corporation and International Law, 6 J. INTL. L. &: EcoN. 247 (1972); Vagts, The
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Article does not deal with the socio-political and economic conflicts
between these enterprises and sovereign states.8 Rather, its focus
will be on the new legal dimensions sparked by the emergence of
MNEs and the applicability of current legal concepts to their operations.
A thorough understanding of the structure and operation of
these enterprises and their business attributes is a prerequisite to an
analysis of the impact of a wide variety of laws on the MNE and
to an appreciation of the challenges these enterprises provide for
both national legal systems and the rules of public international
law. Illustratively, scholarly preoccupation with such basic questions
as the extraterritorial jurisdiction of nations4 may be misdirected
as l<:mg as it ignores the new structural and operational attributes of
MNEs. The business and legal structure of these enterprises is the
key factor in the evolution of corporate, tax, and economic regulatory law, which ultimately will control the development of the
MNE. 5
Consequently, this Article will be devoted primarily to the
establishment of a framework within which the impact and characteristics of the MNE may be considered. A second Article, currently
in preparation~_ will then consider the applicability and validity of
specific legal concepts to the MNE. Thus, rather than emphasizing
orthodox concepts, these Articles will attempt to formulate new
rules that will enable states to exercise effective control over vast
MNEs while, at the same time, encouraging the development of
the MNE as the most advanced instrumentality for promoting the
well-being and increasing the standard of living of the peoples of all
nations.
Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83

HARV,

L. REv,

739 (1970) [hereinafter Vagts).
3. For a discussion of these conflicts, see, in addition to literature cited in notes

I & 2 supra, Hearings on the Multinational Corporation and International Investment Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic
Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1970) [hereinafter MNE Hearings]; FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCfURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
SmucruRE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968) [hereinafter WATKINS REPoRT]. See also
Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Corporation: Some Economic and Political-Legal
Implications, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 631 (1971).
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-FIRSr CONFER•
ENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF REsTRICTIVE
TRADE LEGISLATION 348 (1964); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law,
1964-I ACADEMIE DE DROlT INTERNATIONAL, REcuEIL DES CoURS I (1964).
5. See Wells, The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International
Or~anitation?, 2S INTL. ORGANIZATION 447 (1971).
THE
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THE PRIVATE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN PERSPECTIVE

A.

The New World Economy

A new world economy is evolving primarily because of the internationalization of production.6 Its eventual structure and dimensions
remain to be determined by political, governmental, and legal developments.7 It is apparent that "[a] startling and ... new phenomenon
ha[s] suddenly appeared on the economic horizon." 8
As a result of foreign direct investment, global international production approximates 450 billion dollars, about one sixth of aggregate world production.9 This international production includes more
than 200 billion dollars in output from investment activities in which
American firms are engaged abroad and 100 billion dollars arising
from foreign investments in the United States.10 The balance of 150
billion dollars represents international production by other countries
not involving the United States.11 Foreign direct investment is currently increasing at a rate of about ten per cent per year, exceeding
the growth rate of most nations.12 By the end of the century, this
international1 or multinational, output may well be equivalent to
worldwide production that is not internationalized.13
It is no new phenomenon for the economic interests of nations to
extend beyond their territorial boundaries. Nor do socio-political
conflicts necessarily arise out of such across-the-border activities. But
there are two important differences between previous investment
activity and current developments. 14 One is quantitative: the size and
extent of the ownership of foreign assets surpass previous experiences.
The second is qualitative: today, the principal medium through
6. Rolfe, The International Corporation in Perspective [hereinafter Rolfe], in S. Rolfe

&:

·w. Damm, supra note 1, at 6.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 770 (Statement of Judd Polk, United States
Council, International Chamber of Commerce).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Polk, The New World Economy, 3 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1968, at
7-8 [hereinafter Polk].
13. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 770 (Statement of Judd Polk). However, caution is warranted. There are insufficient data available to evaluate fully this new
phenomenon, and not all of the data presently available are sensitive to the emergence
of the new world economy. See Roback &: Simmonds, International Business: How
Big Is It-The Missing Measurements, 5 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., May-June 1970, at 6
[hereinafter Roback 8c Simmonds].
14. Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Security, 74 .ApELPHl P;\PERS l
(1971) (hereinafter National Securit7J.
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which foreign assets are accumulated is the MNE, an enterprise with
headquarters in the home country (the base country or the investing
country) that maintains operating units in foreign countries (the host
countries).15 Investments by MNEs differ from traditional international investments because "[t]hose of the multinational enterprise are directed and managed day to day according to some business
strategy which links those assets to others all over the globe."16
This second distinction has had particularly important ramifications for well-established principles of international trade. As one
commentator has noted, the traditional theory of comparative advantage assumed
that while products move internationally, factors of production
generally do not ....
The classical doctrine furnished a most powerful support for
liberalizing national trade policies, and this policy is no less important in our day than it was in the last century. But in all honesty we
must shift our emphasis from a theory that argues the benefits of
international trade to one which focuses on how to obtain an optimum international allocation of resources in a world in which productive factors-especially capital-move with considerable ease
among nations whose governments are by no means reconciled to the
phenomenon.17
In economic terms, "[n]o use of resources is justified if the output
can be achieved at a lower cost elsewhere."18 Thus, it has been noted
that United States production abroad results from the interaction of
American management and financing with foreign factors of production through the business network of the MNE.19 The output of
these combined efforts must be considered as international or multinational production.20
15. See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra for a discussion of the business definition of the MNE and text accompanying notes 146-60 infra for the legal definition.
Although this Article is directed to private enterprises, see note 147 supra and C.
FUGLER, MULTINATIONAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (1967) [hereinafter C. FUGLER] for a discussion of multinational public enterprises (some of which are called consortiums).
16. National Security, supra note 14, at 1. This is a large step beyond the days
when foreign assets were primarily represented by pieces of paper issued by governments and economic institutions acknowledging the right of the holder to receive
funds from the issuer, id.
17. Polk, supra note 12, at 8-9. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 794-813 (Statement of John Dunning, Professor of Economics, University of Reading) for a discussion of the net economic effect of investments by MNEs.
18. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 796 (Statement of Judd Polk). The major arguments against this economic statement are political in nature, including questions of
national security. See National Security, supra note 14.
19. Polk, supra note 12, at 9.
20. Id.
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The traditional concept of international trade with its theoretical
framework-including legal concepts and norms-does not fully
cover the realities of the emergence of the MNE. One particularly
striking feature of the "new economy" is that "[c]ountries do not
export, firms do."21 MNEs export mainly through intraenterprise
transactions across national borders.22 Thus, even the comparison between international production and international trade is no longer
fully meaningful since much exporting consists of intercompany sales
among different national components of a single MNE.
One commentator has noted that "the volume of goods and services resulting from international investment has bypassed exports,
and its present growth rate is considerably larger than that of international trade, thus making international investment the major
channel of international economic relations." 28 Foreign direct investment may be quite beneficial to the world, for it may culminate in
the expansion of total world investment and production. The MNE
promotes economic integration and a better allocation of resources
on a global basis.24
B.

The Development of the Modern Private
Multinational Enterprise

I. Historical Evolution
International corporate activity is not a recent development, but
rather the latest step in a well-established economic process. International firms have advanced through various distinctive stages. The
first was the commercial-and-banking era, which dates back to the
thirteenth century when several trading firms based in Italy maintained branches in other European countries.25 This era, extending
from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance through the age of the
great explorers to the mid-nineteenth century, included such famous
participants as the Medicis at its beginning and the Rothchilds at its
end. The second stage was the exploitative era, extending from about
1850 to the years just prior to World War I. 26 During this period,
21. Roback &: Simmonds, supra note 13, at 19.
22. This creates the possibility that the MNE will distort the allocation of income
and expenses to minimize its taxes through manipulation of transfer prices. See text
accompanying notes 301-14 infra. Cf. INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, § 482; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1 (1962), § 1.482-2 (1968).
23. Recommendations and Summary, S. Rolfe &: W. Damm, supra note 1, at 107.
24. Id.
25. See E. KoLDE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 222 (1968) [hereinafter E.
KoLDE].

26. Id. at 222-23.
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investment abroad was motivated by the need to secure reliable
sources of raw materials for the developing industrial revolution.
Interest turned away from the exotic products that had characterized
much of the earlier commercial period and focused instead on industrial products such as minerals and ores. This, in turn, led to the
expansion of colonial rule as countries sought to protect their investments. The third stage, the concessionary era, extending from the
pre-World War I period to the end of World War II, was characterized by long-term concession agreements and the decline of
colonial regimes. The fourth and current stage, to be examined in
this Article, is the international-manufacturing era that is presently
dominated by American firms. 27
The uniqueness of the modern MNE is suggested by its dramatic
contrast with the colonial enterprises of the exploitative era in terms
of economic patterns as well as legal and political dimensions.
National governments granted the giant colonial companies the exclusive right to trade with a particular colony and to exercise the
political powers of the state within that colony. These were not
only monopolistic companies but, in Maitland's phrase, they were
"[t]he companies that became colonies, the companies that make
war."28 These enterprises exploited the colonies to provide raw materials for the home countries for further manufacture and trade. The
companies were immune from the import-export laws such as customs duties, and possessed the power to control international trade.
They were authorized to tax the colonies, to decide disputes, and to
defend themselves against pirates and other enemies; thus they fulfilled the range of governruental functions. Unlike the modem
MNE, these colonial companies were not integrated into the local
economy but remained economically and socially isolated. As a result, most of the beneficial effects of their activities accrued to the
mother country.
The forerunner of the modem MNE had its origins in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A notable and early ex27. See id. at 221; R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY 1-44 (1964); M.
WILKINs, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1970); Hawrylyshyn,
The Internationalization of Firms, 5 J. WoRLD TRAD!!: L. 72 (1971) [hereinafter
Hawrylyshyn]: Rolfe, supra note 6, at 17.
28. Maitland, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES
xxvii (F. Maitland transl. 1913). The British East India Company, the Dutch
East India Company, the Levant Company, the Hudson Bay Company, and the
Massachusetts Bay Company were among the more prominent of these companies.
See generally -P, Eu.sWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 33 (1964); 8 w. HOLDS·
WORTH, A HlsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 200-12 (1937); J. MILL, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH
INDIA (5th ed. 1858) (containing an elaborate history of the East India Company).
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ample was created when the British Lever Brothers Company merged
with the Dutch group Margarine Unie to form what is now the MNE
known as Unilever.29 Lever Brothers acquired facilities for local
manufacturing and distribution in foreign countries. This was the
beginning of a multinational structure, and Lever Brothers' successors developed it into a truly multinational enterprise, which now
operates in some sixty countries and comprises some 500 companies.30
Until World War II, there were very few MNEs based in the United
States.81 The bulk of these American-based transnational activities
were centered in the petroleum and mining industries.82
2. Foreign Investment
The international flow of capital assumes many forms, including
private direct business investment, private portfolio investment,88
private long-term export credit, :financial assistance by national
governments of intergovernmental business organizations, and governmental direct investments.H The MNE operates as the main conduit for the flow of private direct business investment.
Direct investment differs from other types of international capital
movements because it is accompanied by varying degrees of control,
technology, and management.85 International direct investment involves not only capital movement, but also capital formation through
borrowing abroad in the local or multinational markets or by exchanging tangible or intangible property for equity rights-without
exchanging funds through foreign capital markets. Direct investment
29. See E, KoLDE, supra note 25, at 226.
l!O, Id, Following Unilever's example, other European-based MNEs emerged, such
as Royal Dutch-Shell, :Philips, Imperial Chemical lnternational, and Nestle.
81. Id. Several direct investments in Canada, however, have their origin in the
nineteenth century, of which du Pont and Edison (later known as the Canadian
General Electric Company) were among the first. H. MARTYN, INrnRNATIONAL BUSINESS
29 (1964).
32. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 226.
33. Private portfolio investment is the ownership of foreign ~tocks and bonds
primarily for the return on investmeni rather than as a medium for active participation in the management of the foreign corporation. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 219.
34. This mode of capital flow can take the form of an enterprise that is owned by
a government or by several governments and engages in activity in several countries.
It carries out business activities similar to those performed by private enterprises.
There are also mixed governmental-private direct foreign investments, some of which
assume the main attributes of private investments such as the Scandinavian Airline
System. See Angelo, supra note 2, at 471. Although these entities have sometimes been
referred to as MNEs or multinational corporations, they are beyond the scope of this
Article.
·
35. E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 219. See C. K.lNDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at I.
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may also take place through the reinvestment of profits.86 Thus, it is
no surprise to find that foreign direct investment controls37 have had
less impact on the MNE's investments than experience with foreign
investments prior to the modern MNE might have suggested. Such
controls may seriously curb the flow of capital into or out of a country, and even the use of profits retained abroad for reinvestment, but
they do not prevent raising money abroad through international or
multinational financial markets.38
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge directed
the attention of the world to the development of the MNE when he
proclaimed that within fifteen years the world's third-largest producing unit behind the United States and the Soviet Union may not be
36. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 2-3. Illustratively, the book value of United
States direct investment abroad increased by 7.1 billion dollars in 1970. This increase
was partially financed by reinvested earnings of United States-owned foreign corporations that totaled 2.9 billion dollars in 1970. Outflows of direct investment capital totaled 4.4 billion dollars in 1970, out of which 2.9 billion dollars was borrowed
abroad by United States corporations; only 1.5 billion dollars was raised in the
United States. On the other hand, the United States share of earnings, fees, and
royalties from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates totaled 10.8 billion dollars. Statistics
based on U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Oct. 1971) [hereinafter
SURVEY].
37. An example in point is the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, Exec.
Order No. 11,387, 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.101-.1405 (1972), 1972 Gen. Bull., 37 Fed. Reg.
18,294 (1972). Three schedules of countries were established, each with different percentages of permitted outflow and required remittances of earnings abroad. 15 C.F.R.
§ 1000.319 (1972).
38. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 881 (Testimony of Robert Stobaugh,
Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University). See also id. at 764
(Testimony of James W. McKee, Jr., President of CPC International, Inc.). Mr.
McKee stressed that "[a]lthough most large U.S. multinational corporations have been
able to make their peace with these controls and have continued to grow abroad,
there is no question that they have had a distorting and limiting influence." The
MNEs had to borrow funds in the Euro-dollar markets and local markets abroad. They
have been able to find the funds abroad, although this process has slowed down the
rate of investment and has increased interest costs, which in turn have reduced the
profitability of the investments. American borrowing in Europe increased from 500
million dollars in 1959 to almost 3 billion dollars in 1969. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber noted that "[t]he multinational American corporations ••• are investing our own
funds in their own development." Id. at 932. See note 36 supra for the 1970 investment
figures. See also Barovick, United States Firms Have Learned To Live with the OFDI,
BUSINESS .ABROAD, July 7, 1971.
A competing "Asia-dollar" market, centered primarily in Singapore, is growing
at a rapid pace. Many major American banks are opening branches there and are
accepting dollar deposits from throughout Asia. Although the market has been
developing only since 1968, nonresident United States-dollar deposits in Singapore
jumped from 400 million dollars early in 1971 to 900 million dollars by the beginning
of 1972. Although still tiny as compared to the Euro-dollar market, the infant Asiadollar market's potential for growth is thought to be enormous. Asia-dollar deposits
are forecast to reach 2 billion dollars by the end of 1973, although further growth
might be more difficult. See THE EcoNOMIST, Jan. 8, 1972, at 62. See also, Martin,
Here Comes the Asia Dollar, FINANCE, Jan. 1971, at 34; FAR EAsTERN ECON. REV. Y.B.
1971, at 87.
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Europe, but American industry in Europe.39 He further noted that
the European Common Market was, in fact, American in organization.40 The post-World War II period of direct international investment may indeed be termed the American era. While in 1946
American direct foreign investment amounted to only 7.2 billion
dollars, by the end of 1971 that figure was 86 billion dollars, more
than the combined direct foreign investment of the rest of the
world.41
Capital movement, however, does not complete the picture of
foreign investment abroad. Judd Polk concluded that the value of
United States production abroad is twice that of American direct
39. J.-J.

SERVAN-SCHREIBER,

THE .AMERICAN CHALLENGE 3 (1968).

40. Id. Mr. Servan-Schreiber, who is a Deputy of the French National Assembly
and publisher of L'EXPRESS, stated more recently that the real value of American investment in the EEC stands close to 40 billion dollars. He stated that the Americanbased MNEs control ninety-five per cent of total production of integrated circuitsthe basis of the electronics industry, eighty per cent of all electronic calculators and
computers in Western Europe, and thirty per cent of the automobile business. Not
only is the European industrial market thus dominated, but more recently the
capital market has also become subject to American control, primarily through the
Euro-dollar market. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 931-32 (Testimony of JeanJacques Servan-Schreiber). See R.EPoRT OF THE ECONOMIC CoMMITrEE OF EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, Document 197, Feb. 2, 1970, at 26-30, for a table of the industrial and
commercial penetration operations in the EEC in 1967. The massive extent of foreign
(mostly American) investment in Canada is well known. About two thirds of the
Canadian resource and primary manufacturing industries are controlled by foreigners,
and approximately three fifths of her secondary manufacturing industry as well.
MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 915 (Statement of Melville Watkins, Professor of
Economics, University of Toronto).
41. The statistics were compiled by the author from various issues of SURVEY,
supra note 36. In these calculations, figures for direct investment have been obtained
by adding the book value of equity to the long-term debt of foreign enterprises in which
the American enterprise holds more than twenty-five per cent of the equity. If these
book-value figures were adjusted to reflect current values, the result would be double
or possibly triple the book-value calculation. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at
834, 836 (Statement of Jacques G. Maisonrouge, President, IBM World Trade Corp.).
The table below, presenting the author's calculations, based on various issues of
SURVEY, supra note 36, shows the United States direct investment abroad (year-end
book value, billions of dollars):

Total
Manufacturing
Petroleum
Mining &: Smelting
Other Industries

1929

1946

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1971

7.5
1.8
I.I
12.
3.4

72.
1.9
1.8
I.I
2.4

11.8
3.8
3.4
I.I
3.5

19.3
6.3
5.8
22.
5.0

31.9
11.l
10.8
3.0
7.0

49.4
19.3
15.3
3.9
10.9

78.I
322.
21.7
62.
18.0

86.0
35.5
24.3
6.7
19.5

The figures for 1970 are revised and those for 1971 are preliminary.
See J. VAuPEL &: J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 125 (1969)
[hereinafter J. VAUPEL &: J. CURHAN] for a table of the number of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries of 187 United States-controlled MNEs in selected years since
1901.
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investment abroad. 42 Furthermore, because international production
has surpassed exports and has been increasing at a growth rate exceeding exports,4'1 international production will continue to exceed
exports in the world economy; "the primary channel to foreign
markets is via foreign production rather than exports."44 This trend
"is underscored when it is recognized that a full 25 per cent of all
U.S. exports are shipped within or to subsidiaries of U.S.-owned international corporations."45 Confirming this phenomenon is the recent announcement by the EEC that in 1968 the sales of United
States manufacturing subsidiaries operating within the European
Common Market were almost four times the value of American exports of manufacturing products to the EEC and two and one-half
times greater than total American exports to the EEC.46 Despite
some indications in 1968 that American direct investment in Europe
was declining due to overcapacity,47 statistics reveal that direct investment abroad by MNEs based in the United States continues to
increase at an annual rate of ten per cent.48
A very significant recent development has been the increase of
European and Japanese direct investment abroad.49 The value of
foreign direct investment in the United States has risen by more than
one half in just five years, from 8.8 billion dollars at the end of 1965
to an estimated 13.2 billion dollars at the end of 1970.150 Since 1967,
42. Polk, supra note 12, at 8. Professor Sidney Rolfe observed: "This 2:1 ratio is
a rule-of-thumb estimate but probably a pretty good one. Based on 1967 data, output
in the vicinity of $120 billion per annum resulted from U.S. direct investment of some
$60 billion." Rolfe, supra note 6, at 6. By way of comparison, the United States export
figure for 1967 was only 30 billion dollars. On the basis of Polk's more recent estimate,
the ratio appears to be even higher than 2:1. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
43. S. Rolfe &: W. Damm, supra note I, at 107. See Krause, Why Exports Are Be•
coming Irrelevant, 9 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Q. 337 (1971), Krause expresses his view
that the United States is passing out of the industrial age and becoming a service
economy in which exports will become increasingly irrelevant.
44. Polk, supra note 12, at 8.
45. Rolfe, supra note 6, at 6. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
46. The sales of subsidiaries grew from 4.8 billion dollars in 1961 to 12 billion dollars in 1967, and to 14 billion dollars in 1968. EEC Information Service, Press Release,
June 21, 1972, [New Developments] 2 CCH COMM. Mrcr. REP. ,i 9510, at 9129 (1972).
47. The Rush to Europe Slows to a Crawl, BusINESS WEEK, Aug. 3, 1968, at 82;
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, April 14, 1969.
48. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 907 (Testimony of Stephen Hymer, Associate Professor of Economics, Yale University).
_ ..49. See Rhodes, The 4merican <;hal]_enge {Jhalle,:,ged, 47 ~y. Aus. REY., Sept.Oct. 1969, at 45; Rolfe, Updating Adam Smith, INTERPLAY, Nov. 1968, at 15, 17.
50. SUI.WEY, supra note 36, Sept. 1967, at 518, Oct. 1971, at 38. In 1970 the value of
foreign direct investment in the United States rose 1.4 billion dollars, following a rise
of 1 billion dollars in 1969. A substantial portion was related to new acquisitions or
increases in equity investments in a small number of United States corporations, id.,
Oct. 1971, at 36. See also Responding to Le Dt!fi Americain, FINANCE, Jan. 1971, at 30;
Tracy, A Big Foreign Stake in U.S. Industry (A Portfolio), FORTUNE, Aug. 1971, at 118.
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the direct investment of European companies in the United States
has for the first time increased at a greater rate than the direct investment of American-based corporations in Europe. 51
The number of MNEs in the world varies according to the definition of the term employed. According to a recent estimate, there
were about 200 American-based MNEs and fifty based in other countries in the manufacturing and extractive industries in 1969.62 Since
the trend is toward larger and additional !vINEs, "the free world faces
a substantial shift in the ownership and control of industry from
local nationals to foreigners." 53 Thus, in addition to economic consequences, this shift has an important political dimension: "Foreign
control means the potential shift outside the country of the locus of
some types of decision-making."54 Europeans, for example, are emphasizing the need for political power, not to prevent the Americanbased MNEs from coming since they admit that the MNEs are beneficial, but rather as a means of exercising some form of control. 55
51. Hellmann, The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation,
9 ATLANTIC CoMMUNITY Q. 76 (1971). France increased her world direct investment by
approximately 300 per cent in the five years between 1962 and 1967, so that French
investments abroad now equal foreign investments in France. A similar trend is
shown by German and Swedish direct foreign investments. See Rolfe, supra note 6, at
9-12. German direct investment abroad increased from less than 1 billion dollars in
1961 to 3.6 billion dollars in 1968, Runderlass Aussenwirtschaft, No. 14:/69 (German
Dept. of Commerce, Bonn). British direct investment abroad tripled between 1961
and 1967, increasing from 1.3 billion dollars in 1961 to 3.8 billion dollars in 1967, and
then to an estimated 4.9 billion dollars in 1968. (Statistics compiled by author from
various issues of BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL.) Japanese annual direct investment abroad
increased from 92.4 million dollars in 1960 to 224 million dollars in 1967, with a
total of 1.4 billion by March 31, 1968, JAPANESE WHITE PAPER ON EcONO.MIC COOPERA·
TION, quoted in Iwasa, Japan Ventures into Southeast Asia, 4 CowM. J. WORLD Bus.
49, 51 (1969). The table below, compiled by the author from various issues of SURVEY,
supra note 36, shows foreign investment in millions of dollars in the United States in
recent years, employing the same assumptions as in note 41 supra.

Total
'\V'estern Europe
EEC
Britain
Others
Canada
Latin America
Japan
Others

1963

1968

1969

1970b

7,934
5,481
1,728
2,265
1,488
2,183
112

10,815
7,750
2,790
3,409
1.,551
2,659
182
181
43

11,818
8,510
3,306
3,496
1,708
2,834
193
176
105

13,209
9,515
3.,528
4,110
1,877
3,112
228
233
121

158•

a Japan is included in the "Others" category in 1963.
b The figures for 1970 are preliminary.
52. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 1, at 10. See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra for
a business definition of the MNE and text accompanying notes 146-60 infra for a
legal definition.
53. J. BEHR!IIAN, supra note 1 at 10.
54. W'ATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
55. See MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 943 (Testimony of J.-J. Servan-Schreiber).
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The conclusion is irresistible that all industrialized countries are
· sharing in the newly developing world economy, and, despite the
post-World War II American era, there is no longer an American
monopoly of MNEs. As one observer noted, "If European firms become more multinational, and if Americans continue to invest
abroad, we will create a large number of North Atlantic corporations
no longer tied specifically to any particular nation."56
C.

A Business Definition of the Multinational Enterprise

Not every large enterprise that engages in transnational business
is truly "multinational." The term "multinational enterprise" and
its business cognates do not refer to a narrowly defined business
organization. Generally, the popular reference is to any big business
with large across-the-border operations. Those analysts who have attempted more precise definitions encounter substantial difficulties,
often resulting from conceptual misunderstandings or incomplete
data. 57 As one authority has pointed out:
Multinational enterprises were born to utilize with ever increasing
efficiency resources such as raw materials, capital, management and
research. But how many of these corporations can rightly be called
"multinational," and how many are instead merely large enterprises,
which limit themselves to operation on various markets? 58

Since a precise, accepted definition of an MNE does not exist, it
is necessary instead to enumerate the main factors that characterize
such firms and hope thereby broadly to delimit it.
The major identifying criterion of the MNE is the implementation of a global strategy involving all the units of the enterprise and
directed by a single top management. 59 This leads in turn to two
distinctive features of an MNE. First, it transacts a sufficiently substantial amount of business abroad so that its financial status is dependent upon operations in several countries. Objective indications
of an MNE include the proportion of assets, sales, production, and
emplo~ent outside of the home country, 60 foreign affiliates, and
56. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 906 (Testimony of Stephen Hymer).
57. See Roback &: Simmonds, supra note 13, at 6.
58. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 759 (Testimony of Guido Colonna di Paliano,
Director, Fiat Corporation, and former Italian member of the EEC Commission).
59. "The best criteria would seem to be the horizons and strategy of the company
rather than the share of assets or sales outside of the home country." Roback 8c Simmonds, supra note 13, at 10.
60. Such criteria are "biased by the size of the home-country economy and market,"
and therefore are not fully meaningful. Roback 8c Simmonds, supra note 13, at IO.
Thus, a company based in a small country would tend to have a larger portion of its
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distribution of equity by nationality.61 Second, "its management
makes decisions on the basis of multinational alternatives." 62 The
subjective attitude of company executives must be evaluated in estimating the degree of "multinationality" of a firm. MNEs attempt to
coordinate production and sales on a global basis, relying on foreign
plants as alternative sources of supply and transferring components
between the foreign affiliates and parent companies.68 The Ford
Motor Company declares: "It is our goal to be in every single country
there is. Iron Curtain countries, Russia, China. We at Ford Motor
Co. look at a world map without any boundaries."64 Unilever states:
"We want to Unileverize our Indians and Indianize our Unileverans."65 A global orientation of the management toward the main
problems and issues of the enterprise is a vital characteristic of an
MNE.<i 0
D.

Are Multinational Enterprises Really "Multinational"?

Some commentators have attempted to classify firms according to
their degree of multinationality. The Canadian Watkins Report
employs three terms to describe degrees of multinationality.<i7 First,
there is the "national firm," with relatively small foreign operations
and "citizenship" in the home country alone. Second, there is the
"multinational corporation," which "seeks to be a good citizen of
assets or sales outside of the country than a company in a larger country. Id. In addition, direct foreign investment data generally measure investments external to the
home country whereas, in a true MNE, account should be taken of the investment at
home as well as investment abroad. Id.
61. A study of the MNE by the Harvard Graduate School of Business chose corporations listed in FORTUNE magazine's "500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations" that
own twenty-five per cent or more of the equity interest in manufacturing subsidiaries
in six or more foreign countries. See generally J. VAUPEL&: J. CURHAN, supra note 41,
at 2-3; Fouraker &: Stopford, Organizational Structure and the Multinational Strategy,
13 AnMINISIRATIVE SCIENCE Q. 47, 57 (1968) [hereinafter Fouraker&: Stopford].
62. Steiner, The Nature and Significance of Multinational Corporate Planning, in
MULTINATIONAL CoRPORATE PLANNING I, 6 (G. Steiner &: w. Cannon ed. 1966) [hereinafter G. Steiner &: W. Cannon].
63. A Rougher Road for Multinationals, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 19, 1970, at 58 [hereinafter BUSINESS WEEK]. For instance, "IBM Corp. links its laboratories in the U.S. and
abroad with a data transmission network for continuous exchange of research findings.
[Likewise] Ford builds Pinto engines in the United Kingdom and Germany for assembly into cars in the United States and Canada." Id.
64. Id. at 58, quoting Robert Stevenson, Executive Vice-President, Ford Motor Co.
65. Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 4 CoLUM.
J. WoRLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 9, 11 [hereinafter Perlmutter], quoting the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Unilever.
66. Id. at 9. While a recognition of these subjective elements is helpful in explaining the behavior of MNEs, it obviously cannot serve as a workable definition for
an initial classification of firms as MNEs.
67. WATKINS REPoRT, supra note 3, at 33.

744

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:729

each country in which it is operating" 68 and is sensitive to local traditions and policies.69 Third, there is the "international or global
corporation," which owes primary loyalty to no single country and
makes decisions solely on the basis of corporate efficiency.70 As might
be expected from the kinds of distinctions sought to be made, there
are no clear-cut lines separating these three classifications.71
Although "time, transnational mergers, management selection on
a geocentric basis, and further financial crossovers" 72 are likely to
increase the multinationality of even the "national firm," most
MNEs are still identified with their country of origin and thus are
not yet fully multinational.78 Only a few European MNEs have made
strides toward complete multinationalization. Two early Anglo-Dutch
examples are Royal Dutch-Shell and Unilever. More recently, the
tie-up between Britain's Dunlop and Italy's Pirelli is a step toward
full multinationalization,74 as was the Agfa-Gevaert link-up in 1964
combining Belgian and German photographic production and marketing facilities, which previously had been separately owned and
operated,75 resulting in an MNE not identified with a single country.
68. C, K!NDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 180. Professor Kindleberger accepts the
terminology of the Watkins Report in his study.
69. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
70. Professor Perlmutter used very similar criteria, dividing the firms into (1)
"ethnocentric or home-country oriented,'' a firm that is associated with the nationality
of the headquarters; (2) "polycentric or host-country oriented,'' a firm with foreign
subsidiaries that are associated with the local nationality; and (3) "geo-centric or
world oriented,'' a firm that is not identified with any nationality. Perlmutter, supra
note 65, at 11.
71. See Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 13; Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay,
47 FOREIGN .AFF~ 110, 114 (1968). For the problem of defining the MNE, see also
R, ~:LOUGH, INTERNATIONAi, BUSINESS: ENVIRONMENT AND ADAl'TATION 8 (1966); E. KOLDE,
supra note 25, at 218; s. ROLFE, THE lNTERNATIONAI, CORPORATION 8-16 (Study for the
22d Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, Istanbul 1969) [hereinafter
S. RoUEJ; Union o( International Associations, Multinational Business Enterprise,
in YEARBOO~ ON INTERNATIONAI, ORGANIZATIONS, 1968-1969; Angelo, supra note 2, at
469-79; Fatouros, supra note 2, at 326-31.
72. Rolfe, supra note 6, at 17.
73. "Multinational corporations have an address and a nationality, rhetoric and
intentions notwithstanding, and what we should be talking about here are American
corporations operating abroad ••••" MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 911 (Statement
qf Melville Watkins).
74. This tie-up has faced major problems because of the continuing losses incurred
by Pirelli. [Euromarket News] CCH Co~. MKT. REPORTS, No. 199, at 7 (Nov. 7,
1972).
75. !jee Le Page, The Europea71 Merger-Agfa,Gevaert, in lm>uSTIUAL INTEGRATION
IN EUROPE, PRACI"ICE AND P0UCY 9 (Conference sponsored by the federal Trust for
Education and Research, March 1968). A direct merger in the legal sense is impossible
under various European laws and would involve tremendous tax consequences even
where permissible. Therefore, firms endeavor to create a transnational merger in the
economic sense, while preserving legal separation. See notes 172-74 infra and accompanying text.
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In a true MNE, the personnel should be interchangeable between
the parent and the affiliate corporations, yet in most present day
MNEs top management is composed of home-country managers.76
Developing MNEs have moved further toward utilizing multinational
strategies in the areas of financial and product planning than in personnel policies.77 So far, MNEs have been hesitant to promote local
managers to positions at corporate headquarters,78 but there is reason
to believe that, with growing maturity, MNEs will develop multinational personnel policies. The addition of managers from abroad
has given a multinational appearance to the high-level management
of several major MNEs.79 This trend will continue as MNEs adopt
policies aimed at attracting capable management on a global basis. 80
An enterprise that is truly multinational must be multinational
in ownership as well; yet, as in the personnel area, this goal has not
generally been reached. Several MNEs have increased the multinationalization of their sources of funds. Some MNEs have long used
the stock markets in many countries, such as Shell, which is widely
owned in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and France.81 Financial "crossovers" through the foreign buying of
American corporate shares have also been increasing recently.82
General Motors believes that operation through worldwide wholly
owned subsidiaries "facilitates unity, coordinated policy determination and sound operating procedures."83 Therefore, GM encourages
residents of host countries to buy the parent company stock on the
same basis as it is made available to the people of the United States,
without regard to the nationality of the shareholder. 84 Most large
MNEs follow a similar policy,85 and it is anticipated that the listing
76. See Perlmutter, supra note 65, at 12.
77. Rose, The Rewarding Strategies of Multinationalism, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968,
at 180 [hereinafter Rose].
78. Id.
79. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 68, at 58. For instance, the President of IBM World
Trade Corporation is a Frenchman. Likewise, the number two man and finance committee chairman at Black &: Decker is an Englishman. As another recent example,
Motorola announced the promotion of the manager of its Israeli affiliate to its international headquarters.
80. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 58-59.
81. See S. ROLFE, supra note 71, at 107.
82. The ownership of securities of United States corporations by foreigners increased from 8 billion dollars in 1950 to 15 billion dollars in 1967, over IO billion
dollars of which is owned by Europeans. S. RoLFE, supra note 71, at 118.
88, F. DONNER, THE WORLD-WIDE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 106 (1967).
84. However, GM admits there are many obstacles raised by the world legal environment. Id. at 98-102.
85. See S. RoLFE, supra note 71, at 114-15.
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of the parent's stock on foreign stock exchanges will continue to
increase.86 Furthermore, as a result of the capital-flow restrictions
imposed by certain countries such as the United States87 and the
United Kingdom, the Euro-bond market, an unplanned and unregulated international capital market, has developed and has attracted corporate borrowers from both Europe and Japan.88 Other
innovations of international financial sources have followed, including the development of Euro-commercial paper.89
While it is perhaps true that "[t]he aim of the multinational company is, quite forthrightly to become more completely multinational
in terms of its people, its capital, and ownership,"00 it is clear that
most MNEs have not yet reached a stage even approaching complete
multinationality.

III.
A.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

Organization of the Multinational Enterprise

The main objective in the organization of an MNE is to
maximize managerial efficiency. The organizational structure adopted
should enable top management to exercise the desired degree of
control over the various national entities and divisions of the enterprise.
A firm progresses through a series of organizational stages of
multinationalization in its evolution into an MNE.01 Most manufacturing firms, for example, start by exporting their products abroad.
To accommodate this new dimension of operations, the domestic
86. Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty, 45 HAR.v. Bus. R.Ev.,
March-April 1967, at 156, 166 [hereinafter Vernon].
87. The United States program, which was formerly voluntary, became mandatory
by Executive Order on Jan. I, 1968, see note 37 supra, and is controlled by the Com•
merce Department's Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI).
88. S. ROI.FE, supra note 71, at 113.
89. See, e.g., Ullman, Euro-Commercial Paper and Its Legal Problems, WoRLDWIDE P
& I PLANNING, Jan.-Feb. 1971, at 22. See note 38 supra for a discussion of the Euro-dollar
and Asia-dollar markets.
90. MNE Hearings, supra note 3, at 763 (Statement of James W. McKee, Jr.).
91. See generally M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 26-63 (1970) [hereinafter M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS]; BUSINESS lNTERNA•
TIONAL CORPORATION, ORGANIZING THE WORLDWIDE CORPORATION (1970) [hereinafter
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL]; E. KOLDE, supra note 25, at 245-58; STIEGLITZ, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTIJRES OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES (1965); D. ZENOFF, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT 259-65 (1971) [hereinafter D. ZENOFF]; Clee & Sachtjen, Organizing a
World-Wide Business, 42 HARv. Bus. R.Ev., Nov.-Dec. 1964, at 55 [hereinafter Clee &:
Sachtjen]; Fouraker & Stopford, supra note 61; Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81;
BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 64; Rose, supra note 77, at 103.
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organizational structure includes an export department; the firm
may be described as "foreign oriented"-type A.92
As the volume of sales abroad increases, the export department is
no longer capable of handling international sales. Distribution operations and limited manufacturing operations are established abroad,
thereby increasing the degree of multinationalization. To replace the
export department, an international division or an international
headquarters company is established to control all foreign operations; this may be termed the type B firm. 93 The international division is therefore "an independent profit center" on an equal basis
with the domestic product division. 94
As the volume of business abroad continues to increase, a broader
range of manufacturing operations is undertaken abroad. Often the
firm sets up research and development facilities in foreign countries,
To avoid conflicts between the profit responsibility of the international operations and the global management of the enterprise,95
some MNEs have adopted "a product-oriented organization, [placing]
executives in charge of product divisions on a world-wide basis."96
This may be termed the type C enterprise. Foreign and domestic
operations are carried on the same set of books in the product division, and sales opportunities are sought on a global basis-subject
only to the restrictions imposed by the sovereign nations involved.
Thus, under the type C structure, the MNE has much greater coordination between its domestic product divisions and its foreign
marketing operations.07
The type C enterprise may choose a different organizational structure. Instead of product divisions, the company may divide the
former international division into marketing-oriented geographical
divisions; 98 senior executives are then assigned various areas of the
world, domestic as well as foreign, while a worldwide top manage92. See E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 244.
93. Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81. See D. ZENOFF, supra note 91, at 262, for a
diagram of the international division structure of a type B company.
94. Rose, supra note 77, at 103.
95. For instance, top management might find it difficult to make global price adjustments on intercompany transactions. See text accompanying notes 301-14 infra for
a discussion of intercompany transactions.
96. Hawrylyshyn, supra note 27, at 81.
97. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 63, at 140 (discussion of the reorganization
of Rockwell Manufacturing Co.); text accompanying notes 137-45 infra (discussion of
Sperry Rand). See also R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 125-40.
98. See Clee 8e Sachtjen, supra note 91, at 60-62.
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ment oversees the geographical divisions.99 Some MNEs establish a
functional type C organization, in which financial and marketing executives exercise global responsibilities.100 Other MNEs set up a
hybrid structure of worldwide product divisions within geographical areas, especially when consumer products are involved; 101 indeed,
some enterprises even retain the international division or international corporation.102 By carefully structuring its organizational
format and by adopting worldwide approaches,103 the MNE can avoid
conflicts between the domestic product divisions and the international divisions.
Operations abroad may be conducted through either a foreign
subsidiary or a branch. While a multitude of variables, both corporate and legal, determines in a particular instance whether a company will choose the subsidiary or branch form, identifiable trends
have emerged in particular industries. Most marketing-oriented
American-based MNEs operate abroad through subsidiaries and
affiliates, while many service corporations (particularly banks and
advertising agencies) and firms in extractive industries operate
through branches. 104 The majority of American affiliates abroad have
been wholly owned by the parent corporation or other affiliates of
the same MNE.105 Occasionally, a regional center is established between the foreign subsidiary and the parent company. The regional
center facilitates coordination of the activities of local corporations
in a group of countries. The center is regarded as an extension of the
headquarters that has moved closer to the foreign operations.106
While this coordination is particularly necessary in marketing operations, leading some firms to rely entirely on regional marketing
centers, regional centers have also been used to facilitate financial
coordination107 or to take advantage of favorable tax treatment in
"tax haven" countries.108
99. Id. at 61.
100. D. ZENOFF, supra note 91, at 262.
101. See Clee &: Sachtjen, supra note 91, at 62.
102. See E. KoLDE, supra note 25, at 252, for a diagram of the functional type C
organizational structure; D. ZENoFF, supra note 91, at 263-64, for diagrams of product•
oriented type C structure and the geographically decentralized type C structure.
103. See Fouraker &: Stopford, supra note 61.
104. D. ZENoFF, supra note 91, at 190.
105. Id.
106. M. BROOKE &: H. REMMERS, supra note 91, at 43-44.
107. Id. at 45.
108. But see text accompanying notes 168-71 infra.
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Control Within the Multinational Enterprise

One of the major problems faced by the developing MNE is the
necessity of allocating control over foreign operations. In general
terms, MNEs tend to centralize control of basic strategies in order to
operate in the most efficient manner and to exploit opportunities on
a worldwide basis; such coordination is vital because their multiple
affiliates operate in potentially overlapping markets. The MNE can
organize the interchange of products and components on a multinational basis. For example, through its affiliates Massey-Ferguson combines "a French-made transmission, a British-made engine, and a
Mexican-made axle constructed with American-made sheet metal
parts to produce a tractor in Detroit that will be sold in Canada."109
MNEs are quite distinct from solely domestic enterprises in the
sophistication of control necessary to operate efficiently.
Even the strategy utilized to achieve comprehensive control must
be multidimensional. Authority over decisions in the diverse areas of
marketing, finance, and production must be allocated not only benveen various levels of management, but also among the availablelocations on any given level. In the true MNE, management appreciates that strategic choices between domestic and foreign markets
are closely interrelated.11°
The control dimension of the MNE distinguishes it from the
domestic firm. A subsidiary of an MNE in a foreign country does not
necessarily behave in the same way as its "competitor," a domestic
firm in the host country operating under the same market conditions.
They may operate differently and still be rational in their efforts to
maximize profits. The domestic corporation is by definition national,
usually smaller, and maximizes income on a short-term basis in the
domestic market context, whereas the MNE operates in a world environment and maximizes profits on a long-term basis.111
The separation of control from the situs of the subsidiaries or
affiliates raises some difficult political as well as business and legal
problems for the MNE. Political disputes occur when governments
attempt to implement national economic policies through MNEs
based within their jurisdiction, while countries in which the subsidiaries and affiliates of the MNE are operating resist those policies.
Thus, it is difficult to reconcile an asserted right of the home coun109. Rose, supra note 77, at 104.
110. See, e.g., Weisglas &: Coope, Planning in Unilever with Special Reference to
the Common Market, in G. Steiner &: "\V. Cannon, supra note 62, at 223.
111. C. KlNDLEBERCER, supra note I, at 5.
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try to require the parent company to direct its global subsidiaries
to act in accordance with national policies, with the similar right of
the host country to require that subsidiaries operating within its
jurisdiction obey its own divergent policies. At the same time, the
host country may even attempt to regulate the operations of the
parent company in the home country. This leads to inevitable friction between nations, with the MNE as the potential victim of the
conflict. This conflict is illustrated by the various criteria that nations
use to define their jurisdiction over MNEs in determining the nationality, domicile, or residence of enterprises for a range of legal purposes including conflicts of laws, taxation, antitrust laws, balance of
payments regulation, and export controls.112
Ascertaining the location of control for legal and business purposes is very difficult and is not subject to rigid rules. The location
of operating control varies significantly from one MNE to the next,
and is largely dependent on the strategy of control selected. Interestingly, a case can be made for both general control theories: centralization of decision-making at the headquarters level, and decentralization of control at the subsidiary or affiliate level.
The greater proximity of a foreign subsidiary to product markets
argues persuasively for delegation of tactical decision-making from
the parent corporation to the subsidiary. This increased sensitivity to
local conditions makes the subsidiary the logical locus for marketing
decisions and strategic planning.113 As a general proposition, marketing-oriented firms have a more decentralized control structure. Yet,
even in those firms there are certain areas in which a coordinated and
centralized managerial control system may be compelled. Thus, close
supervision by the parent is generally found over aggregate production plans, tax and antitrust strategy, and relations between the
MNE and the host governments.114 Still other firms may centralize
on a broader basis, particularly those with a technical orientation,m
and, when most of the relevant knowledge, skill, or resources are at
company headquarters, there is a tendency to centralize.116 One MNE,
"which sees itself as being at once centralized and decentralized, feels
that it operates in three dimensions: a global dimension of central
policy making, strategy and research; a continental dimension of
m_anufacturing and management development; and a national dimen112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See text accompanying notes 315-29 (tax), 348-68 (antitrust) infra.
See R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 156 (1967).
Id.
See BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 5.
Id. at 42-47.
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sion of marketing, treasury, and personnel."117 Some enterprises delegate authority to a regional center. The regional center, when one
exists at all, can be used as a "post office for messages in transit or as
an important decision-making unit."118
It is difficult to conclude that control generally is being either
centralized or decentralized. Not long ago, decentralization seemed
to be prevailing in international business, but at a later stage there
were indications of a shift to a greater degree of centralization.119
Centralization permits more definitive and pervasive policies for
long-range planning in terms of international markets.120 Developments such as "worldwide and regional economic integration, increasing competition on a multinational basis, [and] ... the rapid development of faster communication systems and transportation media"
have provided further incentive to centralize.121 Just recently, however, signs of decentralization have again appeared as the size of foreign interests and operations of firms has continued to grow, thereby
making centralization less manageable and efficient.122 Thus, much
decision-making authority has been delegated back to the foreign
subsidiaries or regional headquarters. 123
If any generalization about the forms and trends of control in
MNEs is possible, it is only that the location of control must be
ascertained on a case-by-case basis. Governments desiring to control
the business operations of MNEs must direct their legal commands to
that component of the MNE that is empowered to respond-the
place where the effective control lies with respect to the particular
issue under consideration. Nations must look at the entire corporate
network of the :rvfNE in order to determine where the particular
authority resides, and they must consider whether addressing directives to local affiliates will achieve the desired policy objectives.
117. Id. at 5.
118. M. BROOKE &: H. REMMERS, supra note 91, at 125.
As a firm's international operations expand and become a more significant determinant of its financial status, enterprises begin to recognize the need for a high quality
communications system. Yet, the communications system designed may vary according
to the purpose sought to be achieved. When communication is desired for decisionmaking purposes, it is, of course, necessary to assure that the communications channels
mirror the established organizational decision-making chain. But when, by contrast,
the communications system is established for informational purposes only, it need
not track the organizational system precisely. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91,
at 5.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 132.
123. Id.
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National policies may well be frustrated if states treat a local affiliate
of an MNE as a wholly independent entity without regard to the
actual location of authority and control over the particular subject
matter sought to be regulated.124
C. Illustrations of Organizational and Control Structure
of Multinational Enterprises
The utilization of these organizational and control techniques
can be illustrated by examination of two MNEs that have adopted
widely divergent systems of operation: IBM World Trade Corporation and Sperry Rand. 125
Despite the fact that the international company or departmental
structure is generally employed by a type B firm, 126 many MNEs continue to use it. A leading example is IBM, which operates abroad
through its IBM World Trade Corporation (World Trade), a wholly
owned domestic subsidiary. 127 World Trade maintains controlled
decentralization of responsibility on a regional basis.128
The control structure of World Trade clearly documents the
general control patterns discussed above.129 Marketing operations
are decentralized in order to maximize sensitivity to local customer
demands. But, because World Trade's technology is quite advanced
and rapidly changing, product development and research are coordinated globally, thereby establishing a link not only between the
subsidiaries within World Trade, but also maintaining operating ties
between the domestic parent and the foreign operations.130
World Trade's line structure is geographical.131 Foreign business
in 106 countries is divided among four areas, two of which are fur124. The EEC Court of Justice adopted this approach in its recent Dyestuff decisions. See text accompanying notes 354-68 infra.
125. The discussion of the structure of IBM and Sperry Rand is based on BUSINESS
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 13-17, 26-28.
126. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
127. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 12-13.
128. Id.
129. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra.
130. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 14:
[P]roduct development and manufacturing are centrally assigned to various
specialized development laboratories and plants throughout the world. Under
this system each development laboratory is highly specialized in a particular
technology and each plant manufactures a specific range of products for the local
market and for export. This creates an interdependence among foreign and
domestic plants.
The laboratories and plants are owned by the company operating in the country in
which they are located, and they report to that company.
131. Id. at 15, 17.
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ther divided into two regions.182 The top officers of the areas are responsible to the president of World Trade.183 Within a given area,
management is further subdivided on a geographical basis.134 World
Trade "has delegated major operational responsibility to the country
level."185 Many decisions, principally in the areas of "financing requests, external government contracts, engineering and manufacturing coordination, ... and final approval of plans and budgets"186 are
made by country managers.
Sperry Rand presents an interesting contrast to the organizational
and control structure of IBM and World Trade. Instead of maintaining a separate international division, Sperry Rand has elected to
structure the company into internationally oriented product divisions.187 "Some of the product divisions have their own international
departments; others operate in turn as worldwide corporations."188
Thus, the product divisions exercise responsibility over both domestic and foreign operations, facilitating coordinated global strategy.189
Despite the degree of decentralization inherent in the product
division structure, Sperry Rand is able to maintain channels of communication that "cut across product lines."140 The "umbrella company," a device that "join[s] all Sperry affiliates in a single country
under a single legal framework," 141 is utilized to exercise control at
the international level. The umbrella company "channels communications among the product divisions within the country [and] . . .
presents a unified corporate image of Sperry Rand to the public."142
However, actual line responsibility is not exercised by the umbrella
company but is transmitted between the product division in the
foreign country and the parent product division headquarters in the
United States.148 Over 100 foreign companies have been associated
under the umbrella format. 144 In addition, further control is main132. Id. at 17.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 27.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 19 for a list of characteristics of the MNE, many of which are particularly applicable to Sperry Rand.
140. Id. at 27.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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tained through regional offices that coordinate "companies of a single
product division within a specific region."145
Thus, two major MNEs have adopted widely differing organizational and control structures in order to manage effectively international operations. Their experiences indicate the range of alternative strategies available to an emerging multinational enterprise.
IV.

THE

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE FROM A
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

A Legal Definition

The law relating to international corporate investments remains
undeveloped despite the dramatic rise of MNEs since World War II.
The lack of a definitive international business law, despite large-scale
international economic transactions, has not gone unnoticed.146 Thus,
while the character of business has become multinational, the essence
of corporate law remains national. This incongruity creates problems
for company management and other interested groups, including the
investing public, organized labor, the general public, and regulating
nations.
There is no generally accepted legal definition of the MNE. The
typical MNE is a cluster of separate legal entities in several jurisdictions, which exist only if the laws of each jurisdiction recognize
them as legal entities. The MNE is a business and economic creature,
and the usage of that term is presently found only in those fields. The
lack of a precise legal definition results in the use of a multiplicity of
inconsistent and confusing terms to describe these business operations. Even the use of the term "multinational" is not standard and
exclusive. Terms such as "plurinational," "transnational," "international," "supranational," "global," "world," and others are used
in this context, often interchangeably. The term "enterprise" does
not have a precise legal connotation and is used interchangeably with
other more common terms of business organization such as "corporation," "company," "firm," "body corporate," "corporate combine," or "corporate enterprise."
The term "multinational enterprise," convenient as a descriptive
business term, is also preferable as a legal term. MNEs are not
organized under any kind of international or supranational law;
therefore, it is not accurate to call them international or suprana145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. PA.
L. R.Ev. 575 (1947) [hereinafter Timberg].
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tional enterprises.147 MNEs do not derive a legal personality from
international law, as, for example, from a treaty or act of an international organization. They are organized under, and governed by,
each country's national laws. Nor are MNEs organized under an international uniform corporation law pursuant to a treaty. Hence,
these corporations cannot be regarded as international in the sense
that contracting states have assumed specific obligations concerning
the treatment and privileges applicable to such enterprises.148 The
term "multinational corporation," which is widely used in business
literature, is also misleading since an MNE usually consists of several
corporations or other forms of business organization. Such a group
of related corporations, each with its own legal identity, constitutes
a single economic entity-the "enterprise."149 However, properly
viewed the MNE is not a single legal entity, but rather a group of
corporations throughout the world sharing a single underlying economic unity. One commentator thus correctly observed that the
MNE may be referred to as a multinational cluster of corporations
in several countries, controlled by one headquarters. 160 Accord147. There is the exception for intergovernmental joint ventures that may be
recognized as "international corporations" because they are created by treaty. See Note,
Corporations Formed Pursuant to Treaty, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1431 (1963). However, this
is not the case with private business enterprises that must organize under national
laws. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws 437-43 (1971) [hereinafter E. STEIN]. Some examples of the international corporation are the Scandinavian
Airline System (SAS), Air Africa, the Suez Canal Company, and such international
institutions as the Bank for International Settlements, the International Finance
Corporation, and the Central American Air Navigation Services Corporation. Another example stems from the Convention Respecting Luxemburg Railways, Between
Belgium, France and Luxemburg, April 17, 1946, 27 U.N.T.S. 103, which established
a company to operate Luxemburg Railways. For further examples of such international
public enterprises and their legal status, see C. FLIGLER, supra note 15. Such "international corporations" play a relatively minor role in the new world economy. For
a definition of the international corporation, see Goldman, Les socit!tt!s internationales,
in CoURS PROFESSE A. L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALE DE PARIS 2 (19611962), cited in Schmitthoff, Multi-National Companies, 1970 J. Bus. L. 177. See also
Kahn, International Companies, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 498 (1969).
148. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 437-38.
149. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 343, 344 (1947),
for the argument that "where the corporate entity is defective, or otherwise challenged,
its existence, extent and consequences may be determined by the actual existence and
extent and operations of the underlying enterprise, which by these very qualities
acquires an entity of its own, recognized by law." While courts all over the world have
focused on the underlying enterprise for various limited purposes, such an entity has
not yet been generally recognized by law. For further discussion of the concept of
enterprise, see E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 196 (1936) [hereinafter E. LATTY]; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 12 (1925) [hereinafter Ballantine]; Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws, 42 HARV. L. R.Ev. 516, 528 (1929). See notes 252-89
infra and accompanying text.
150. Aharoni, On the Definition of the Multinational Corporation, 11 Q. R.Ev. EcoN.
8c Bus. 27, 35 (1972) (suggesting that such a multinational cluster must involve corporations operating in at least five countries).
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ingly, the term "multinational corporation" is properly reserved for
reference to the corporation that controls an MNE (or the multinational cluster).151
This Article is concerned with the normal forms of international
investment carried on by private firms. Most MNEs consist of several
business units in several countries, each one of which is an established
legal entity.152 Thus, the MNE has been defined as "a business
organization characterized by (a) business operations in two or more
countries, (b) a unified top direction, and (c) legally distinct but
economically dependent business units subject to that unified direction."153 The various corporations or other legal entities of diverse
nationalities are joined together by ties of common control and respond to a common management strategy. It is these ties of control
that distinguish the MNE as a business phenomenon from a group
of separate firms in different jurisdictions merely engaged in business
relations with each other. Of course, the extent to which the international headquarters actually directs the operation of the various
national companies depends, as has been noted, on the peculiar
management strategies of the individual enterprise.154
In a typical MNE, the headquarters is a central parent holding
company155 that controls the various foreign subsidiaries either
directly or, more commonly, through a foreign holding company.
Control is usually assured by ownership of a majority of stock of the
controlled firms.156 The foreign subsidiaries are established by the
parent company or formed by acquisition of control of existing companies. MNEs are also formed by combining two or more companies
from different countries. After merger or reorganization, the former
firms may or may not be dissolved.157 Whether or not the companies
are formally combined to form a new legal entity, the actual economic result is a single, unified enterprise.
151. Such terminology is correct from a legal point of view since its relates to a
single corporation, but because it is frequently used inaccurately in business literature,
such a controlling corporation will generally be referred to in this Article as the parent
corporation, to distinguish it from the MNE as a whole.
152. See Litvak &: Maule, The Multi-national Firm and Conflicting National
Interests, 3 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 309, 311 (1969), for a diagram of the various business
relationships that can be created by the MNE.
153. Timberg, supra note 146, at 577. In fact, the author called the MNE "an
international combine." Id.
154. See notes 108-24 supra and accompanying text.
155. See text accompanying note 165 infra.
156. This is typical of MNEs based in the United States. In many cases MNEs
insist on having wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries, although control can
be assured, as a practical matter, by ownership of less than a majority of the stock.
157, Cf. INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 368(a).
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The MNE resulting from economic integration is not necessarily
formed by means of stock control. Control can also be obtained by a
contract between formerly independent companies in which each
firm becomes obligated to adhere to common business strategies. A
variety of contract forms are available to accomplish this result.158
These forms of control are often designed to avoid the legal obstacles
to mergers across national boundaries that arise from transfer of a
company's headquarters or principal place of business from one
country to another.um
Regardless of which form or legal technique is used to establish
the enterprise as a single economic entity, it is the interaction between the transnational control of business groups and national political institutions that generates the most significant legal and political
conflicts involving the MNE. The question raised is in what instances, and to what extent, will nation-states recognize the existence
of the control ties.160 In other words, when and for what legal purposes do the regulating countries consider the local business operation as a separate entity, and when do they view it as an integral part
of a larger enterprise controlled abroad?
B.

The Form of Business Organization

The precise form of business organization selected for each unit
of the MNE in the various countries of operation depends on a
combination of general management planning, the relevant business
laws of the host country and the home country, and any international
agreements to which the two countries are signatories. The result is
that the MNE is comprised of different types of legal entities, which
generate more than mere differences in terminology.

I. The Corporation
Because of the predominant role played by American-based
MNEs, perhaps the most widely used business form is the corporation. Corporations range in size from the gigantic firm owned by
several millions of shareholders to the "close" corporation held by
one or a few shareholders.161 The existence of the corporate form
158. This is typical of the European-based MNE, such as Unilever, which is a
combination of the British Unilever Ltd. and the Dutch Unilever NV. The German
Agfa and the Dutch Gevaert were integrated through the use of a holding company.
See text accompanying note 75 supra. See also notes 370-75 infra and accompanying text.
159. See text accompanying notes 172-74 infra.
160. See notes 369-94 infra and accompanying text for the recognition of control
ties by the Konzernrecht, the German Law of Related Companies.
161. Despite the substantial differences between the closely held corporation and
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allows an enterprise to organize a series of related corporations
through which the business of the firm is conducted. Properly used,
the separation of the enterprise into distinct legal entities enables
corporations to achieve greater efficiency. It can provide a convenient
vehicle through which a single group can manage many different
businesses, particularly when it is desirable to distinguish between
the manufacturing, marketing-service, and financial divisions of the
enterprise. Central business strategies may be formulated, provided
the disadvantages of over-centralization are appreciated.162 The multicorporate operation of an enterprise may also be a direct result of
the parent corporation's expansion through purchase of stock in
companies in the same field. Thus, "a corporation, control of which
has been acquired by purchase, may be operated as a subsidiary to
retain the benefit of its well-advertised corporate name, and good
will and separate merchandising policies . . . ." 163
The separation of an enterprise into distinct legal entities also
serves to reduce financial risks. Subsidiaries may be used for risky
divisions or uncertain business ventures in order to limit liability
to the property of the subsidiary corporation, thereby immunizing
the parent and its other subsidiaries from those particular risks.164
The holding corporation is a device created to serve the needs
of large business combinations, especially when the individual companies of the enterprise are domiciled in different states or countries.165 Holding companies may be divided into two basic types.
There are financial holding companies "which invest in securities
solely for the purpose of dividend or interest income and capital
gains, without performing any actual commercial or industrial
services for affiliated companies."166 Then there are industrial or
commercial holding companies in which the parent company renders
the publicly held corporation, in many of the fifty American states both are organized
under and subject to the same corporation statute. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 100-6804
(Deering 1962). However, some modem statutes contain provisions specifically governing
close corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1968 Cum. Supp.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 608.70-.77 (1972-1973 Supp.). Statutes in several other states contain provisions that, as a practical matter, are relevant only to close corporations. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT, §§ 55-73 (1965). See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 15, 16(£), 32, 34-37,
40, 50, 54, 60, 73, 79, 143-45 (1969), for important provisions especially applicable to
close corporations.
162. See L. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAw 195 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter L. GOWER].
163. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 168 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter H. BALLANTINE].
164. Id.
165. 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2821
(Perm. Ed. 1963) [hereinafter W. FLETCHER].
166. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO CoMPANY
FORMATION 37 (no. 263, 1970) [hereinafter ICC 263].
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services on a permanent basis and interacts with affiliated companies
within the MNE, primarily for purposes of expansion.167 Due to
the advantages of the holding company over a consolidation, purchase, or lease, many holding companies have been formed for the
purpose of controlling other companies.168
Although the holding company developed in the context of the
American federal system, the principle is of great utility in the international context. The MNE can use one or more of its companies
(usually in the form of an intermediate holding company) as a profit
center to facilitate reinvestment of earnings abroad. Expansion of
subsidiary operations is particularly encouraged when such earnings
enjoy tax deferrals in the home country until actual remittance,
so that earnings of foreign subsidiaries are taxed by the home country
only if and when they are distributed to the parent company in that
country. However, this possibility, as applied to American-based
MNEs, is restricted by the Revenue Act of 1962,169 and similar limitations are currently in effect or contemplated by a few other industrialized countries, notably Canada-where it has been adopted but
is not yet effective170-and Germany-where it has been passed by
the Bundestag (Parliament) but is awaiting action by the Bundesrat
(Council of State).171 There are, however, differences in the scope of
these laws.
The corporate form in general, and the holding company form
in particular, can assist the MNE in mitigating the effect of restrictive
laws of undeveloped nations and the conflicts in legal requirements
among the various sovereignties involved. In a regional market, such
167. Id.
168. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2821. The holding company form can be
used to integrate numerous operating corporations as a means of facilitating the sale
of securities or utilizing service contracts with subsidiaries. Control may be maintained
through a pyramid structure with a holding company at the top controlling intermediate holding and operating subsidiaries, which in tum control operating subsidiaries at the base. Such a structure can result in maximum control with minimum
investment. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 163, § 168. See A. BERLE &: G. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-75 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter A. BERLE
& G. MEANS] for a discussion of "pyramiding."
The holding company is only one of many structural forms available to control
large businesses. The "megasubsidiary," a massive wholly owned subsidiary corporation, has developed only recently, but already occupies an important position in business. See Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate
Control, 84 HARv. L R.Ev. 1577 (1971).
169. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. See text accompanying note 328 infra.
170. Income Tax Act of 1970, c. 63, §§ 90-95. See Verchere &: Pound, The New
Canadian Tax Law: A Summary of How It Operates, 37 J. TAX 220, 223 (1972).
171. See [Doing Business in Europe] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 30,603 CTuly 19, 1972):
2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 1/4 (1971); CCH, HARV. WORLD TAX SERIES, TAXATION IN GER•
MANY 1f 1814.
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as the European Common Market, the holding company is used to
accomplish transnational mergers. A direct merger involving the
dissolution of the constituent companies across national boundaries
is impossible under some laws and, even where possible, generally involves tremendous expenses, primarily in taxes, as the consequence
of moving the central administration of a company from one country
to another.172 In reality, such transnational mergers have taken place.
In view of the uncertainty regarding the legal consequences of such
mergers on the Continent, the current corporate practice is to form a
mutual subsidiary company to which the operations of the integrating companies are transferred. The stock of the new subsidiary is
divided between the two founders pursuant to their agreement.173
The two companies can thus set up new operating companies, dividing the stock between themselves and converting the two parents into
holding companies, which are managed by the same directors. The
result is the creation of one economic unit instead of two, despite a
legal separation.174
Generally speaking, the MNE may adopt the most beneficial
business form for transnational business operations, taking into account the relevant home country laws, host country laws, and international treaties. The example of an American-based MNE can be
used to illustrate the adaptability of MNEs to changing circumstances. What business form is appropriate for investment in Latin
America? Assume that tax factors are critical and that other considerations are unaffected by the investor's decision. The MNE may:
(a) establish an operating subsidiary in the Latin American country,
directly or through an intermediate holding company, or (b) set up
a branch (permanent establishment) in the Latin American country.
For American tax purposes, the operating subsidiary is a separate
tax entity.175 The enterprise may enjoy tax deferral until repatriation of eamings.176 Repatriation may be accomplished through the
intermediate holding company serving as a profit center abroad. The
172. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 364-87; Conard, Corporate Fusion in
the Common Market, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 573 (1966). Liquidation involves taxation of
the hidden reserves and thus prevents many mergers. See, e.g., Storm, A New Impulse
Toward a European Company, 26 Bus. I.Aw. 1443 (1971) [hereinafter Storm),
173. See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 2, at 504-05; Mann, The European Company, 19
INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 468, 478-79 (1970).
174. The Agfa-Gevaert "merger," between the largest German and Belgium manufac•
turers of photographic products, is an example in point.
175. See notes 290-300 & 316 infra and accompanying text.
176. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 951-64.
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MNE may also enjoy special tax treatment because of investment in
developing countries.171 In addition, operation through a subsidiary
can be desirable from the host country's viewpoint. Frequently the
MNE may enjoy the benefits of concessions laws, which encourage
investment by providing for national treatment (nondiscriminatory
treatment as a domestic investor) only if a separate entity is established in the host country. In other instances, domestic incorporation
is obligatory.178
If the MNE prefers, on the other hand, to launch its foreign
investment through a permanent establishment in the Latin American country, the foreign investment will be taxable in the United
States as part of MNE operations. This would enable the United
States investor to deduct early period anticipated losses from the
venture abroad.179 A third alternative open to an American-based
MNE investing in Latin America is to establish another United
States corporation, complying with the Western Hemisphere trade
corporation provisions that grant a special tax deduction to qualifying
corporations.180 Also available to an American-based MNE for investment abroad is the new Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC). 181 By utilizing this corporate instrumentality, the domestic
corporation that engages primarily in export sales and meets certain
other requirements qualifies for a fifty per cent tax deferral of earnings abroad. Thus, an enterprise may choose among many alternatives, each with its own peculiar advantages, when considering
foreign investment.
177. The main advantages result from the foreign tax credit provision, which, after
the Revenue Act of 1962, resulted in special treatment for foreign corporations in less
developed countries. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, § 902. Section 1248(d)(3) provides an
exemption for the gains from a sale or exchange of stock owned by a foreign corporation in a lesser developed country. Sections 951-64 (particularly sections 954(b)(l),
955(b)(l), &: 955(c)) provide certain exceptions from the 1962 abolition of the tax deferral
for Subpart F income for foreign companies in lesser developed countries. See generally
Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical
Appraisal, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1393 (1966).
178. See Tm: AlTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIITEE To STUDY
LAws, REPORT 87 (1955) [hereinafter Armnmsr LAws].

THE

.ANTrrnusr

179. This is a very important factor in high-risk operations or when losses are anticipated for the first years of the investment. However, a tax treaty between the countries
involved can alter the applicable rules. See Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the
Financial Planning of the Multinational Enterprise, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 111 (1972)
[hereinafter Hadari].
180. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, §§ 921-22.
181. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 991-97 for a definition of DISC and related terms.
See also B. BilTKER &: J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS ANO
SHAREHOLDERS § 17.14 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter B. BITl'KER &: J. EusnCE].
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2. European Business Forms
The business entities forming an MNE represent not only differences between countries, but also between available alternatives
·within a given country. In Britain, for example, the most important
form of business is the company limited by shares, which may be
a "public" or a "private" company. The major differences between
these forms lie in restrictions on the number of shareholders and the
transferability of shares. Private companies must have at least two,
but no more than fifty, shareholders (although exceptions are made
for current and former employees), must impose restrictions on the
transferability of shares, and are prohibited from offering their
shares to the public.182 A public company must have at least seven
shareholders183 and does not have restrictions on either the maximum
number of shareholders or on the transferability of shares.184 The
private company is much more prevalent than the public company,
and may command substantial resources and employ large numbers
of employees; thus, the private company is a potential business form
for an MNE's subsidiary in Britain. Most of the provisions of the
British Companies Act apply equally to private and public companies. These two business forms appear in the many countries that
follow the British system such as Israel,1811 Australia,186 and South
Africa. 187
On the Continent there is a different statutory framework.188
182. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 1, 28.
183. Companies Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § I.
184. The British public companies should not be confused with government-owned
corporations or with publicly held corporations (or "quoted" companies). See L. GOWER,
supra note 162, at 234-41. Public companies can be privately owned and not listed on
the Stock Exchange.
185. Israeli Companies Ordinance of 1929, as amended, § 25A. The Ordinance was
based on the English Companies Act of 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23.
186. Australian Uniform Companies Act, §§ 5, 15, which has been adopted by the
separate Australian states. See, e.g., Companies Act of 1961 of New South Wales, §§ 5,
15. The Australian facsimile of the British private company is known as a "proprietary
company."
187. Companies Act, No. 46 of 1926, § 104.
188. The literature on the various types of European business organizations includes
THE COMPANY-LAW, STRUCTURE AND REFORM IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES (C. de Houghton
ed. 1970) [hereinafter C. de Houghton]; R. PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON
MARKET (2d ed. 1970); E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 87-117; Bott&: Rosener, The Groupement d'Interet Economique, J. Bus. L., Oct. 1970, at 313; DeVries &: Juenger, Limited
Liability Contract: The Gmbtl, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 866 (1964); Fabricius, The Private
Company in German Law, J. Bus. L., July 1970, at 229; Kohler, New Corporation Laws
in Germany (1966) and France (1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation
Law for the Common Market, 45 TuL. L. REv. 58 (1968); Kohler, The New Limited
Liability Company Law of France, 24 Bus. I.Aw. 435 (1969); Scholten, Company Law in
Europe, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 377 (1968); Steefel &: Falkenhausen, The New German
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There are continental equivalents of the stock corporation.189 However, there is also the limited liability company, in which ownership
is not normally evidenced by share certificates but rather by quotas
with transferability limitations.190 This hybrid business form between a stock company and a partnership is without parallel in
Anglo-American law. 191 The limited liability company is subject
to more flexible statutory requirements than stock companies, and
this type of company is frequently found when there are only a
small number of owners with no intention of going public.
These and other forms of doing business are subject to different
legal requirements according to the law of the country of incorporation. The management of the MNE must consider many variables
including the requisite necessary capacity to form the business
unit; 192 the required minimum or maximum number of shareholders; the capital structure; the form of shares (registered or
bearer); voting rights; the rights and liabilities of shareholders, creditors, employees, and officers; the eligibility of directors; 193 and the
various provisions relating to control of the day-to-day operation of
the firm.
Of more enduring concern to the MNE may be the differences in
the rules of management and control of the company. Different legal
requirements in various countries may interfere with the efficient
management of the MNE, causing artificial fragmentation of the
enterprise and additional operating costs. One example is provided
by German law. A German subsidiary of an American-based MNE
Stock Corporation Law, 52 CoRNELL L. REv. 518 (1967) [hereinafter Steefel &: FalkenhausenJ; Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARV. L. REv. 211 (1966) [hereinafter Perspectives]; Wooldridge, The Private Com•
pany in French Law, J. Bus. L., Oct. 1970, at 317.
189. They are the "societe anonyme" (S.A.) in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and
Switzerland; "aktiengesellschaft" (A.G.) in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; and the
"societa per azioni" (S.p.A.) in Italy. ICC 26!1, supra note 166, at 8. In addition there is
the "naamloze vennootschap" (N.V.) in the Netherlands.
190. Id. The limited liability company is known as "Societe a responsabilite limitee"
(S.a.r.l.) in France; "Societe de personnes a responsabilite limitee" (S.P.R.L.) in Belgium;
"Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung" (G.m.b.H.) in Germany; "Sociedad a responsibilita limitada" (L.T.D.A.) in the Latin American countries; and "besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid" (B.V.) in the Netherlands.
191. Id.
192. For instance, in Belgium only two or more natural persons (not corporations)
may form an S.P.R.L., DROIT CML ET COMMERCIAL bk. 1, tit. IX, § ll9. (Codes Larder
1970).
193. Although under most enabling corporation laws there are no restrictions concerning the nationality or residence of directors, some do have restrictions. In Switzerland, for instance, except in holding companies, the majority of directors mlll!t be of
SwiM nationality and domicile. ConE FEDERAL DES OBLIGATIONS § 7II (Payot 1962).
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has a different structure of power and control than its American
parent corporation. While under prevailing corporation laws in the
United States the corporation is managed by a single board of directors that is appointed by and responsible to the shareholders, a German company is managed according to a two-tier system consisting
of a board of management and a supervisory board. 194 The supervisory board oversees the board of management and reports to the
shareholders.195 It appoints or removes the members of the board of
management,196 but does not interfere with the day-to-day conduct
of business, which is in the hands of the board of management.197
The supervisory board members, except for labor representatives,
are elected by the shareholders in a straight-line voting system.198
The German two-tier system, with modifications, has been introduced
in France under its law on Commercial Companies of I 966.199
A variant of Germany's two-tiered management system was enacted in the Netherlands in 1971. A supervisory board may be established by all Dutch companies,200 but must be established by "large"
companies.201 A company is a "large company" if it has capital,
including reserves, of at least ten million guilders, it or its subsidiaries have an "employee's council," and the company and its
subsidiaries normally employ one hundred persons or more in
the Netherlands.202 The supervisory board in large companies nominates and removes the members of the board of management (directeuren),203 adopts the financial statements,204 and approves important
specified decisions of the board of management.205 The members
194. AKTIENGESETZ 1965 (AKTG) §§ 76-116 (the German Stock Corporation Act of
1965). See CCH CoMM. MKT. REPORTS (transl. F. Juenger &: L. Schmidt 1967) for an
unofficial bilingual translation. For a discussion of the two-tier system in Europe, see C.
de Houghton, supra note 188, at 140-63; E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 91-155; Perspectives,
supra note 188, at 50.
195. AKTG § 11l (1965).
196. AKTG § 84 (1965).
197. AKTG § lll(4) (1965).
198. AKTG § 101 (1965).
199. C. COM., app. 8, pt. 2, §§ 118-50 (Petits Codes Dalloz 1967).
200. WETBOEK VAN KOOPHANDEL (W.v.K.) § 50 (the Netherlands Business Corporation
Code). See CCH COMM. MKT. REPORTS No. 193 (transl. Morris, J. van de Ven &: Westbroek
1972) for an unofficial English translation. See also van de Ven, Corporate Developments in the Netherlands, 27 Bus. LAW. 873 (1972) [hereinafter van de Ven].
201. W.v.K. § 52h.
202. W.v.K. § 52c(2).
203. w.v.K. § 521.
204. w.v.K. § 52m.
205. The following actions are subject to supervisory board approval: issuance of
shares and debentures by the company, listing shares on a stock exchange, collaboration
with other firms, acquisition of a large portion of the stock of other companies, and
termination of employment of a considerable number of employees. W.v.K. § 52n.
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of the supervisory board are normally elected by the board itself.206
A large corporation that belongs to an MNE may be exempted,
however, from some of the foregoing rules if it is a subsidiary of
another company and most of the employees of the whole enterprise
are employed outside the Netherlands, or if it is a company that
almost exclusively renders management and financial services to such
a subsidiary.207 Additional exceptions are provided for Dutch affiliates of foreign companies.208 Other EEC members will have to amend
their company laws to provide for dual management, should the
Commission's fifth directive on harmonization of company law be
adopted.200
Another feature of the German law that has an impact on MNE
operations in that country is the concept of "codetermination" under
which a company's employees participate in management.210 Two
types of codetermination presently exist in Germany: full codetermination in companies with over 1,000 employees in the coal and
steel industries; 211 and partial codetermination in all limited liability
companies (G.m.b.H.) with over 500 employees and in all stock companies (A.G.) except family-owned companies with fewer than 500
employees.212 Full codetermination entitles the representatives of
the workers and the shareholders to an equal number of seats on
the supervisory board.213 In addition, a neutral balancing member
is chosen to represent the public interest.214 In partial codetermination, one third of the supervisory board is appointed by the employees215 and there is no labor member on the board of management.216
Finally, the relationship between the employees and the com206. W.v.K. § 52h.
207. W.v.K. § 52c(3).
208. (Doing Business in Europe] CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1!11 26,7II, 26,721 (1972).
209, ECC Commission, Proposal for a Fifth Directive, Oct. 19, 1972, 15 E.E.C. J.O.
Cl31/149 (1972) [hereinafter Fifth Directive]. See Fifth Directive on Company Law
Harmonization Proposed, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 11 9532 (1972).
The Fifth Directive is proposed pursuant to the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 54(3)(g), 298 U.N.T.S. 39.
210. See generally C. de Houghton, supra note 188, at 213-21; E. STEIN, supra note
147, at 92-97; Steefel & Falkenhausen, supra note 188, at 537; Perspectives, supra note
188, at 65.
2II. Law on Codetermination of Employees in Supervisory Councils and Executive
Boards of Coal, Iron & Steel Producing Industries of May 21, 1951, § 4, [1951] BGBI. I
847. 348 (Mitbestimmung) [hereinafter Law of May 21, 1951].
212. Law on Works Council of Oct. II, 1952, § 76(i), [1952] BGBI I 681, 691 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) [hereinafter Law of Oct. II, 1952].
213. Law of May 21, 1951, § 4, [1951] BGBl. I 348, 349.
214. Law of May 21, 1951, § 8, [1951] BGBI. I 348.
215. Law of Oct. II, 1952, § 76(i), [1952] BGBl. I 691.
216. Law of Oct. II, 1952, § 76, [1952] BGBl, I 691.
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pany's management is governed by the new Works Council Act.217
The Act provides for the management, duties, and rights of the
Works Council elected by the employees. The Works Council is
entitled to discuss and negotiate labor disputes with management,218
and if no agreement is reached, a conciliation board established by
both parties will decide the dispute.219 The Works Council has the
right to be informed and consulted on various labor matters. 220
Significantly, the Works Council is entitled to codetermination on
many important economic, business, and social decisions that affect
the welfare of the employees.221 The right of employees to be informed and consulted by management is broad enough to include
such matters as structural changes and mergers of the enterprise,222
as well as various general economic subjects.223
Other European countries also provide for employee representation in the managerial process. In France, although employees of an
S.A. are not entitled to appoint members of either board, a company
employing over fifty persons must establish a Works Council (comite
d'enterprise), members of which are employees.224 Since 1968, a
compulsory employees' profit-sharing program has been in effect.225
In the Netherlands, under recently enacted legislation, a Dutch
company or a local branch of a foreign company, which employs a
hundred persons or more, is required to establish an Employees
Council,226 elected by the employees. The company's director (bestuurder) is also a member of the Council.227 The Council must be
informed of the financial position of the company and its general
business activities, and normally has advisory powers in certain im217. Law on Works Council of Jan. 15, 1972 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) [hereinafter
Law of Jan. 15, 1972). See CCH CoMM. MKT. REPORTS (transl. H. Beinhauer 1972) for
an unofficial English translation.
218. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 74.
219. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 76.
220. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 90.
221. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 87, 91, 99, 102.
222. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 111-13.
223. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, §§ 106-10. The Act provides for the establishment of an
Economic Committee by the Works Council in enterprises with more than 100 perma•
nent employees.
224. Ordinance of Feb. 22, 1945, C. CoM. app. 2, pt. 2, at 514 (Petits Codes Dalloz
1971).
225. Ordinance No. 37-693 of Aug. 17, 1967, C. CoM. app. 2, pt. 2, at 527 (Petits
Codes Dalloz 1971), supplemented by Decree No. 67-1112 of Dec. 19, 1967, C. CoM.
app. 2, pt. 2, at 532 (Petits Codes Dalloz 1967).
226. Wet op de Ondememingsraden, art. 2.1 (Employees Council Act of 1971).
227. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 6.1.
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portant corporate matters specified in the law. 228 The Council's advice is particularly important in certain matters relating to the
employees such as wages, training courses, hiring, promoting, and
firing of employees, and is absolutely required in other labor matters,
including pension and profit-sharing plans, which are void absent
the Council's advice. 229 The Council may recommend members to
the supervisory board in large companies230 and object to appointments to the supervisory board.231 Such an objection may be overruled by the Dutch Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische
Raad). 232 The codetermination system is now proposed for all EEC
members. 233
V.

THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

A. The Modern Enterprise
The forces which have generated these multinational corporate
groups are not simple ....
One has been the emergence of the corporate form itself, endowed
with attributes that give it extraordinary advantages as a vehicle for
doing business. The corporation can count on perpetual life; it can
hope to attain unlimited size; it can bear children or create parents
or generate siblings; and it can endow each of its newborn relations
with such nationality as seems convenient.284
MNEs are integrated on a global basis, a characteristic not enjoyed by political institutions.235 Since effective regulation of the
affairs of a national government is largely confined to activities
within its borders, any extraterritorial objective "involves either a
conflict, a negotiation, or a concordat with other sovereign powers."236
By contrast, the upper management of an MNE can effectuate its
228. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 25.1. See van de Ven, supra note 200, at
875. The company is exempted from giving such information and from the Council's
advice if significant interests of the company would be endangered.
229. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, art. 27.I. See van de Ven, supra note 200, at
875.
230. W.v.K. § 52h(4).
231. W.v.K. § 52h(6).
232. W.v.K. § 52h(9), (10).
233. Fifth Directive, supra note 209.
234. Vernon, supra note 86, at 157. The sharp increase in the efficiency of transportation and communication was also mentioned as a significant force contributing
to the emergence of the MNE.
235. See Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International Administration,
19 U. Cm. L. REv. 739, 741 (1952). The author favored using the corporate concept to
accomplish the integration of the international political community.
236. Id.
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worldwide strategy provided only that a nation does not forbid
foreign investment and that the MNE honors domestic laws.237
Modem corporations now exercise powers once available only
to natural persons. Thus, most contemporary legal systems have recognized the corporation as a legal entity separate from the individuals
who own it.238 One of the primary functions of the corporate form
is the insulation of individual stockholders from liability for corporate debts. Additional advantages and attributes include separation
of management and control from ownership, easy transferability of
ownership, ability to retain earnings for internal growth, large investments in research and development, and attraction of large sums of
funds either through equity participation or debentures. These
factors and the ever increasing sophistication of managerial skills
and techniques have brought the corporation to its present status as
the principal mode of business organization. Thus, large publicly
held corporations now control the economies of most countries.239
B.

A Corporation's Power To Incorporate
and Own Other Corporations

The legal prerequisite that is fundamental to the establishment
of an MNE is the power of a corporation to purchase and hold stock
of another corporation. This power is recognized by most legal
systems. In the United Kingdom, for example, a company has this
power unless expressly prohibited.240 Similarly, in Canada the power
is provided by the Dominion Companies Act.241 In the United
States, at common law a corporation had no power either to subscribe
for, or purchase, stock in another corporation absent an express provision either in its charter or by statute, although exceptions were
recognized if the stock purchase was a necessary or reasonable means
of achieving a corporation's objectives.242 Corporate acquisition and
retention of stock was occasionally found to be contrary to public
policy.248 Even when express power to invest in other corporations
was authorized, it was not interpreted to include the power to sub237. Cf. id.
238. See generally 1 W.

FLETCHER, supra note 165, §§ 5-14 for the typical attributes
of a corporation.
239. See A. BERLE &: G. MEANs, supra note 168, at 119-40, for a discussion of the evolution of the modern corporation.
240. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2824. Cf. L. GoWER, supra note 162, at 194-95.
241. CAN. REY. STAT. § 16(l)(c).
242. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40 (1899):
California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897); First Natl. Bank v. National Exch.

Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
243. See, e.g., State ex rel. Boynton v. Wheat Farming Co., 153 Kan. 282, 110 P.2d
795 (1941); Robotham v, Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (1903).
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scribe for stock in the formation of another company.244 Presently,
however, the power of a corporation to acquire another's stock is
granted by the corporation laws of most states; 245 but, if under state
law a domestic corporation is not allowed to own stock in particular
instances, the prohibition applies to ownership of stock in a foreign
corporation as well.246
Many corporation laws require more than one incorporator to
establish a corporation, and further provide that incorporators must
be natural persons.247 These requirements, however, do not prevent
the use of "dummy" incorporators to establish subsidiaries and holding companies of the controlling parent.248 A parent company can
use persons who have no real interest in the corporation to act as
incorporators in order to comply with statutory formalities; usually,
after incorporation the dummies' shares are then transferred to
the real party in interest-the controlling corporation.249 Reflecting
the prevailing realities, the Model Business Corporation Act was
revised in 1962 to allow incorporation by one person, including a
corporation.250
Corporation statutes frequently require additional formalities
relevant to the establishment of an MNE. Some require that a corporation have more than one shareholder, as, for example, in England
where a private company must have at least two shareholders.251
The use of such requirements, however, has not precluded the use of
dummies to assure full de facto ownership by the parent corporation.
C. Recognition of the Wholly Owned Subsidiary as
a Distinct Entity

I. The General Rule and the Enterprise Theory
Another legal prerequisite to the establishment and successful
operation of the wholly owned subsidiary is the recognition of the
244. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2829. Even a grant of such power in the
articles of incorporation or in bylaws has not been sufficient in some cases, id. §§ 2830-32.
245. Id. § 2833 (including citations to the various statutes). However, there are still
state constitutional or statutory limitations on such power, restrictions that are in fact
merely declaratory of the common law. Usually such resrictions are confined to corporations of a particular kind, id. § 2834. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Am: § 4(g)
(1969).
246. 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 2835.
247. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-48 (1953).
248. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 185 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter H. HENN].
249. Id.
250. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Am: § 53 (1969). The current trend among the
states is to follow the Model Act and permit a single incorporator. H. HENN, supra
note 248, § 131.
251. See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
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separate legal existence of "one-man" corporations. The leading
English case, Salomon v. Salomon & Co.,252
opened new vistas to company lawyers and the world of commerce .... It finally establish[ed] the legality of the one-man company and showed that incorporation was as readily available to the
small private partnership and sole trader as to the large public company ... ,253

One-man corporations are also recognized by American law,254 and
large corporations make extensive use of them in the creation of
subsidiaries and holding companies.
In civil law countries, the issue was not resolved quite so easily.
Originally, civil law provided that a corporation was created by a
contract among stockholders, rather than by a charter granted by the
state.255 Under civil law, therefore, the one-man corporation was "an
anomaly-a one-man contract."256 Today, many civil law countries
permit wholly owned subsidiaries, although in some countries it remains uncertain whether the parent company may be held responsible
for the debts of its subsidiaries.257 Such financial responsibility is also
possible, in certain circumstances, under the new German Law of
Related Companies.258
Generally, however, the parent corporation, its subsidiaries, and
all of the related holding and affiliated companies are recognized and
treated as separate and distinct legal entities. This is true even if the
parent owns all the stock of the subsidiary, and the management of
the corporations is identical.259 Absent illegitimate purpose, the
252. [189'7] A.C. 22,
253. L. GoWER, supra note 162, at 70. In addition, it was possible for "a trader not
merely to limit his liability to the money he put into the enterprise but even to avoid
any serious risk to the major part of that." Id.
254. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 163, § 128; G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION L4.W AND
PR4.CTICE § 751 (1959, 1968 Supp.) [hereinafter G. HORNSTEIN].
255. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 327-28 & n.37, 419; Alyea, Subsidiary Corporations Under the Civil Law and Common Law, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1227, 1229-34 (1953)
[hereinafter Alyea].
256. Vagts, supra note 2, at 742 n.13 (1970).
257. See Alyea, supra note 255, at 1232.
258. See text accompanying notes 377-79 infra.
259. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Brown v.
Margrande Compania Naviera, 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968); Garrett v. Southern
Ry., 173 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), affd., 278 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1960); Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Botwinick v. Credit Exch., Inc., 419
Pa. 65, 213 A.2d 349 (1965).
In England, although the theory of agency was applied to lift the veil of a subsidiary company, Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corp., [1939] 4 All E.R.
116 (K.B.), it is still an exception to the general rule. See Ebbw Vale U.D.C. v. South
Wales Traffic Area Licensing Auth., [1951] 2 K.B. 366 (C.A.). See generally Pickering,
The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, 31 Mon. L. R.Ev. 481 (1968).
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separate corporate identities will generally be recognized. However,
the corporate veil will be pierced when "the corporate device has
been used to defraud creditors, to evade existing obligations, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate a monopoly, or to protect
knavery or crime . • . :•200
Courts have gone further, in exceptional cases, to ignore the
separate existence of corporations in order to treat affected parties
"equitably." In the context of a multiple corporations case, the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized:
It is not, properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating the application, in particular circumstances of the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do
would work fraud or injustice.2 61

Courts have not clearly articulated the theory under which the
corporate form may be disregarded for the purposes of preventing
fraud or injustice. One commentator has attempted to classify decisions by the courts, which use a variety of terms and purport to
apply many different theories, into five theories: 262 the alter ego
theory, the identity theory, the instrumentality theory, the agency
260. Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51
L R.Ev. 1373, 1401 (1938). For evasion of statute cases, see, e.g., Chicago, M. &:
St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic&: Commerce Assn., 247 U.S. 490 (1918); Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (attempt to evade antitrust laws through
holding company). For evasion of contract cases, see, e.g., Dairy Co-operative Assn. v.
Brandes Creamery, 147 Ore. 488, 30 P.2d 338 (1934). For disregard of a subsidiary corporation when it is used to defraud creditors, see, e.g., Eisenrod v. Utley, 211 F.2d 678
(9th Cir. 1954).
The English courts have occasionally pierced the corporate veil, finding British subsidiaries to be the agents of the American parent corporation. In re F.G. (Films) Ltd.,
[1953] 1 W.L.R. 483 (Ch.) (emphasizing thin capitalization); Firestone Tyre &: Rubber
Co. v. Llewellyn, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464 (H.L) (agent for tax purposes). See also In re
Greater London Properties Ltd. Lease, [1959] I W.L.R. 503 (Ch.); Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Soc., Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L., Sc.); Holdsworth &: Co. v. Caddies, [1955] I W.L.R. 352 (H.L., Sc.); Spittle v. Thames Grit 8e Aggregate, [1937] 4 All
E.R. IOI (K.B.).
The case law on the Continent does not vary significantly from its common law
counterpart. Continental systems also developed tl1e doctrine of lifting the corporate
veil in exceptional circumstances. The implementation of the doctrine varies from
country to country, thus no general rule can be stated. In the continental countries the
theory has not yet achieved the status it enjoys in the United States. See Cohn &:
Simitis, "Lifting the Veil" in the Company Laws of the European Continent, 12 INTL.
&: COMP. L.Q. 189 (1963). However, Germany achieved far-reaching results along the
lines of the enterprise theory in the provisions regulating the Konzern, AKTG 1965.
See notes 369-86 infra and accompanying text.
261. Taylor v. Standard Gas &: Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939) (the "Deep Rock"
case).
262. Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102, 1116-21 (1971) (liability of a corporation for the contracts of its subsidiary). See also Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979
(1971).
HARV.

772

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:729

theory, and the estoppel theory. However, since courts have generally
recognized little more than a semantic distinction between the first
three theories, the sounder view is to distinguish between disregarding the corporate entity on the one hand, and applying general
legal concepts to this area, such as agency or estoppel, on the other.
Thus, some cases that speak of disregarding the corporate entity are
more properly understood as applications of general agency theories,
as, for example, when the acts of a controlled corporation are attributed to the controlling corporation for the purpose of imposing
liability because the former is found to be the agent of the latter.
This most often occurs in the context of a contractual claim when it
is demonstrated that the controlled corporation entered into a
contract on behalf of the controlling corporation, or when a tort is
attributable directly to the controlling corporation under the doctrine of respondeat superior.263 In these agency cases, it is the controlled corporation that does the act in question; in the other line
of cases the broader enterprise does the act; the courts look through
the corporate form of the controlled corporation in order to reach
the underlying economic reality of a single business undertaking.
This distinction is not always observed by the courts, which often
speak in terms of disregarding the corporate entity while nevertheless purporting to apply agency concepts.264
In those cases actually disregarding the corporate entity, the
recurring theme is that courts will focus on the whole enterprise
as a single economic unit, rather than on the multiple-corporate
forms used by such an enterprise. Therefore, this general theory is
more properly termed the "enterprise" theory.265 This theory, properly construed, encompasses at least three theories that have heretofore been regarded as separate and distinct by the courts. First, the
enterprise theory may be invoked to disregard dummy corporations
or sham transactions involving fraud or lacking any business substance.266 Second, in applying the enterprise theory, courts have
occasionally focused on the fact that the controlled corporation is
so closely identified with its parent corporation as to make effectively
263. See, e.g., Chicago, M. &: St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic &: Commerce Assn., 247
U.S. 490, 501 (1918); Fissez v. Intl. Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Wyoming Constr.
Co. v. Western Cas. &: Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960).
264. See Ballantine, supra note 149, at 18. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore &: O.R.R.,
247 App. Div. 144, 155-56, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 74, afjd., 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
265. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
266. See text accompanying notes 291-95 infra for the application of the sham
theory for tax purposes.
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the two corporations one "identity" of enterprise.267 "In the 'identity'
theory the separate corporate entity of the subsidiary is disregarded
and the parent and the subsidiaries are regarded as one."268 Third,
in other circumstances the enterprise theory has been applied when
a corporation is under the control of another corporation and has
acted as its instrumentality in general or in a particular transaction.
Some courts have used this factor to formulate an "instrumentality"
rule. 269 A frequently cited decision summarized the conditions that
justify the invocation of this rule:
Restating the instrumentality rule, we may say that in any case
except express agency, estoppel, or direct tort, three elements must
be proved:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other
positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.270

It should be emphasized that under the enterprise theory the
controlling company is held responsible for the acts in question
because it is the real actor in the transaction and its management had
the decision-making power with respect to the particular activity per~
formed. Under such circumstances, any given act of the controlled
company may be imputed to the controlling company since, conceptually, the controlled company is but a part of the larger enterprise. But, all other activities, when the subsidiary has acted independently, may not normally be imputed to the parent. Under the
enterprise theory, the controlled company is in fact "a fragment of
the larger corporate combine which actually conducts the busi267. See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); State ex rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942). This is a
situation where for all practical purposes the two corporations are one economic unit,
the independence of the controlled corporation did not in effect exist, and an adherence
to the fiction of separate entity would serve only to defeat justice by allowing the
economic entity to escape liability.
268. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div. at 156, 287 N.Y.S. at 75.
269, See Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940), for a list of the circumstances relevant to the application of the instrumentality rule.
270. Lowendahl v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 247 App. Div. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76.
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ness."2 ~1 Therefore, such subsidiary or affiliate is not necessarily a
sham, a dummy for, or identical in all respects to, its controlling
company. Under such an approach, for example, a tax haven company, which has no real substance, and a big operating subsidiary
of an MNE may both be disregarded with respect to certain activities
that in effect are controlled by the parent and therefore are regarded
as acts of the enterprise as a whole. Such an enterprise might be the
entire MNE or any group of companies of which the controlled
company is but a fragment.
While. it is premature to announce the death of the distinct
entity concept in the context of affiliated companies, recent developments have made it difficult to define with precision the "exceptional
cases" in which a subsidiary will now be treated as an agent or fragment of its parent.272 Whether a corporation is an agent or fragment
of its parent is a question of both fact and policy that cannot be
answered in vacuo. 213 It is thus difficult to generalize a rule emerging
from the many cases struggling with differing instances of intercorporate relations. The following guidelines have been suggested
to assure recognition of separate legal entities:
(I) A separate financial unit should be set up and maintained ..•
to carry on the normal strains [of the business].
(2) The financial and business records of the two units should be
kept separate.
271. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414,418,223 N.E.2d 6, 8, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585,588
(1966). The enterprise theory has been expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in
the labor field:
The [National Labor Relations] Board is entitled to show that these separate corporations are not what they appear to be, that in truth they are but divisions or
departments of a "single enterprise" •••• {T]here is a question whether in fact
the economic enterprise is one, the corporation form being largely paper arrangements that do not reflect the business realities. One company may in fact be operated as a division of another; one may be only a shell, inadequately financed; the
affairs of the group may be so intermingled that no distinct corporate lines are
maintained. These are some, though by no means all, of the relevant considerations, as the authorities recognize •••• The petition should be reinstated insofar
as it charges the existence of "a single enterprise" • • • •
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc. 361 U.S. 398, 402-04 (1960). The Deena rationale has been
followed in P.F. Collier&: Sons Corp. v. FTC, 427 F,2d.26l, 266-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); ACME Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 422 F.2d
1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 752 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965).
'
272. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 165, § 43; 2 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 254, §§ 75159; N. LArnN, THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS§§ 24-26 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter N. LArnN];
Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REv.
1122 (1958).
273. National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965);
Bowater S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1962). See N. LATIIN, supra note 272,
§ 25; E. LAITY, supra note 149, at 220; Ballantine, supra note 149, at 18-19.
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(3) The formal barriers between the two management structures
should be maintained ....
(4) The two units should not be represented as being one unit.274
While stock control and common directors are generally prerequisites to the application of the enterprise theory, they are insufficient by themselves to warrant disregard of the separate identity
of the controlled corporation.
Those familiar with present day methods of corporate control will
not be so naive as to suppose that the complete domination in fact of
its subsidiaries by a holding company owning all their stock is in
any way inconsistent with scrupulous recognition of their corporate
entities, or with maintenance of separate accounts and distinct personnels of officers and directors.275
The actual exercise of control is a much more important factor. 276
It should be noted that even subsidiaries and affiliates that adhere to
the foregoing guidelines would be assured of only general recognition
as separate legal entities; they would not be considered sham corporations and the identity concept would not be applicable to them.
It would not prevent, however, the application of the enterprise
theory to specific transactions that are controlled by the controlling
corporation or that are otherwise attributed to that corporation.
One should keep in mind this distinction between the general application o{ the enterprise theory so as to negate the corporate
identity completely, and the restricted application of the theory to
specific situations. This restricted application of the theory might
be termed partial disregard of the corporate identity; the terminology
used notwithstanding, the end result is the attribution of an act to
a single economic enterprise.
In many cases the entity status has been denied for contract or
tort purposes if the subsidiary or affiliate was inadequately capitalized.277 Courts have also given effect to the enterprise theory in
274. Douglas &: Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929).
275. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 498, 506 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
276. See Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 575, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967); text accompanying note 270 supra. For a discussion of factors other than control which will support a finding of separation, see Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966).
277. See Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 26 N.W.2d 757 (1947);
E. I..ATIY, supra note 149, at 119-41; Comment, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries,
19 U. CHI. L. REv. 872 (1952); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959). See also Comment, Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U. L.
R.Ev. 123 (1968); Comment, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28
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going behind the corporate structure to reach the single economic
entity for narrow purposes. Thus, a Canadian bank and its French
subsidiary have been treated as one entity for service of process
purposes; 278 two corporations were permitted to maintain a joint
action to recover consequential damages for injury to one corporation's property caused by the taking of the affiliat:e's propert:y;279
a court held that a parent corporation could be liable for debts
incurred by its subsidiary prior to dissolution of the subsidiary; 280
and an individual stockholder and a sister corporation were held
liable for services and materials provided to a brother corporat:ion.281
Furthermore, when multiple corporations are used to avoid obligations under a collective bargaining contract:282 or to avoid back-pay
orders,283 the courts will look to the~conomic unit to avoid defrauding creditors or circumventing contractual obligations.
A recent development: important: to the MNE is legislation directed toward regulating groups of companies.284 These legislative
innovations suggest that governing authorities, in addition to courts,
will occasionally ignore the distinct entity concept and instead view
the corporate network as a single economic ent:ity.285 The rationale
for this departure from traditional doctrine is a desire to protect the
interests of third parties and minority stockholders. It is submitted
Omo ST. L.J. 441 (1967); Annot., supra note 262 (contracts); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1343
(1966) (torts). Cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Taylor v. Standard Gas &:
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
278. Public Admr. of County of New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127,
224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967). Similarly in Taca Intl. Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls•
Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 99, 204 N.E.2d 329, 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, ll!O
(1965), an American subsidiary was held to be a "separately incorporated department
or instrumentality" of a British parent company for service of process purposes.
279. California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
280. Edwards v. Chicago&: N.W. Ry., 79 Ill. App. 2d 48, 223 N.E. 2d 163 (1967).
281. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R.
Grace&: Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920).
282. See, e.g., John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Wirtz v.
Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1964).
283. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc. 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
284. The major development in the area is the AKTIENGESETZ, the German Stock
Company Act of 1965, with a whole set of rules to regulate many of the problems con•
cerning related companies, AKTG §§ 291-338 (1965). See text accompanying notes 369-94
infra for a discussion of the new German law and text accompanying notes 395-426
infra for a discussion of the European company proposal. In England, the Companies
Act of 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 §§ 150-54, introduced provisions requiring consolidated
accounts from holding and subsidiary companies. Accordingly, the holding company's
accounts have to produce a true statement of the affairs of the group as a whole. The
Companies Act of 1967, c. 81, § 4, extended the requirements by including more com•
panies within the scope of the regulations.
285. See, e.g., L. GowER, supra note 162, at 216. See generally id. at 194-200, 213-17.
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that this rationale for the application of the enterprise theory should
be extended from the micro-level to the macro-level to protect not
only private interests but also national interests such as fiscal286
and socio-economic policies.281 Furthermore, the enterprise theory
should also be utilized in order to preserve the integrity of the MNE
and its centralized control as long as application of the theory does
not obstruct national policies; thus, the MNE's intercorporate arrangements should be exempt from certain prohibitions imposed on
independent corporations.288
It has been stated that "[w]here it is necessary to do so in order
to do justice, the courts have not infrequently disregarded the separate corporate entities and treated the two corporations as one."289
A survey of the cases, however, reveals that courts are very reluctant
to look behind the corporate entity without clear proof of evasion or
fraud. It is in the area of corporate taxation that this principle faces
its most severe test.

2. Disregard of the Corporate Entity for Tax Purposes
The income tax statutes in most countries contain express provisions under which tax authorities may fully or partially disregard
the separate existence of a corporation in a multicorporate structure
if to do so is necessary to prevent tax avoidance or tax evasion.290
In the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary, a corporation is generally treated as an independent entity for tax purposes.
Nevertheless, courts are not blind to economic realities and will disregard the corporate entity in order to defeat tax avoidance through
286. See notes 301-29 infra and accompanying text for the protection of fiscal interests.

287. See notes 348-68 infra and accompanying text for the protection of antitrust
policies.
288. See text accompanying notes 330-37 infra for the exemption of the MNE's intercorporate arrangements from certain antitrust restrictions.
289. California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591, 593 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
290. See, e.g., INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 482. Statutes also provide for special circumstances under which taxpayers may elect to disregard a corporation for tax purposes. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77, providing that the shareholders
of certain small business corporations ("subchapter S corporations") may elect to disregard the corporate entity for tax purposes and thereby be taxed on their pro rata
share of the income, an approach similar to the tax treatment of a partnership.
Other statutory provisions permit the entire economic enterprise to be treated as
one taxable entity notwithstanding the number of individual corporate members. See,
e.g., INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1501, providing that an "affiliated group of corporations"
may elect to file a single consolidated return for the whole group (enterprise). The
result is that the enterprise is taxed in accordance with its consolidated taxable income,
which reflects the transactions with unrelated entities and tends to ignore the intercompany dealings within the group. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1502-13 (1966).
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the use of multiple corporations or in order to reach the real tax.payer in interest.291 Thus, under long-established tax principles,
courts will refuse to recognize a corporation as a distinct entity if it
lacks economic reality and is a sham.292
Many cases in this area involve an artificial multicorporate structure formed principally for tax avoidance purposes. To distinguish
between real and sham corporations, the courts have experimented
with many tests including the "business activity" standard articulated
by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.293 Recognizing that a corporation might be organized for a
variety of reasons, the Court stated that "so long as that purpose is
the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying
on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate
taxable entity."294 A variant of the business activity standard is the
tax avoidance doctrine, which, in the words of Judge Learned Hand,
provides "that to be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation,
a corporation must engage in some industrial, commercial, or other
activity besides avoiding taxation." 295
The theories applied by the tax courts are analogous to the
agency and enterprise theories applied to determine corporate liability in other settings.298 For example, the tax court has held that
the entire income of sixteen alphabet corporations was taxable to
the controlling corporation because "they carried on no separate
independent income-producing activities [and served no function
other than avoiding taxes]. They were mere corporate shells acting
as a conduit for [the controlling corporation]."297 Yet, in tax avoidance cases the courts prefer to apply tax principles or statutory
provisions that allow taxation according to the reality of the enterprise instead of formally disregarding the corporate entity. For in291. An entity may, for example, be treated as a corporation for tax purposes even
though it does not satisfy the formal requirements of a corporation for other legal
purposes. An early attempt to summarize the leading cases in the area was made by
Judge Learned Hand in National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467-68 (2d Cir.
1944).
292. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
293. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
294. 319 U.S. at 439.
295. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d at 468. See generally B. BrrrKER 8:
J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, §§ 1.05, 2.10, 15.07; 7 J. MERTINS, THE I.Aw OF FEDERAL IN•
COME TAXATION §§ 38.07-.15 (1967, Supp. 1972); Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968); Cleary, The Corporate
Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAX L. R.Ev. 3 (1945); Watts, Tax Problems of Regard for the
Corporate Entity, in 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 867 (1962).
296. See notes 252-89 supra and accompanying text.
297. Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 603 (1959).
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stance, the controlling corporation cannot escape taxation by anticipatory attempts to divert income to another entity; income will be
taxed to the party that earns it, and assignment of income will not
be permitted.298 Under the long-standing judicial doctrine of sham
transactions, transactions lacking economic substance and legal business purpose will be ignored for tax purposes.299 Illustratively, when
a parent sold portfolio stock at a loss to its wholly owned subsidiary
-and yet retained economic control over the property for fifteen
years following the sale, the court held that the sale was invalid for
tax purposes.300 The court did not challenge the separate corporate
entity of the subsidiary and ignored only the sham intercompany
sale. Thus, under these and other doctrines, the taxing authority is
able to look at the substance rather than the form of incomeproducing activities without having expressly to disregard the corporate entity.
D.

Application of the Corporate- Entity Concept
to the Multinational Enterprise

The foregoing legal principles that govern the recognition of
the corporate entity are equally applicable to multinational business.
Local courts may seek to reach the controlling corporation in a
range of "exceptional cases" and for a variety of legal purposes.
It is particularly in the tax and antitrust fields that national governments realize the importance of recognizing the entire economic unit
of the MNE.

I. Disregard of the Corporate Entity for
International Tax Purposes
a. An overview of possible abuses by the multinational enterprise
through transfer prices. Tax revenues are an important economic
benefit to the nations in which MNEs operate. Business operations
of MNEs embrace many national tax jurisdictions resulting in
multiple ta.x liabilities. Therefore, one of the major problems presented by the emergence of the MNE is the equitable allocation of
298. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 3II U.S.
ll2 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, Il4-15 (1930); !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269,
482, 1551, 1561.
299. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473
(1940); Griffith v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1957); National Investors Co.
v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
300. National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964).
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its income-and its income taxes-among the participating states.
The challenge to world tax systems is to promote the efficient operation of the MNE in a manner that will not distort the proper allocation of resources by tax avoidance (underlap) or subject MNEs
to double taxation (overlap).301
This objective is made difficult because the MNE has the power
to allocate its income and expenses among its corporate members
around the world. The principal means by which this is accomplished
is the intercompany (intraenterprise) transaction. 302 Because such
transactions are controlled by the same party in interest, the prices
charged do not necessarily reflect the prices that would have been
charged between the MNE and an unrelated business. The existence
of this manipulative power has caused nation-states to monitor
closely these allocation decisions.
The most important type of intercompany transaction in the
manufacturing and extractive industries is the intercompany sale of
goods.303 "Intercompany sales are the single most important method
effecting movement of capital between countries in which [an MNE
operates]." 304 These include sales of finished and unfinished goods,
components, equipment, and supplies between the parent company
and its foreign subsidiaries, and between affiliates of the MNE.
Assuming other relevant variables are constant, an MNE maximizes worldwide after-tax profitability by transferring its goods at
a relatively low price to subsidiaries in nations that have relatively
low corporate tax rates.305 Similarly, the MNE will maximize aftertax profits if it buys goods at relatively high prices from its affiliates
that are subject to comparatively low corporate tax rates. The price
at which the MNE sells goods or services from one member of the
enterprise to another is called the transfer price. Insofar as intercompany sales and transfer prices determine the jurisdiction in which
profits are taxed and the level of income produced, local tax authorities are concerned. As a result, tax authorities may challenge an
301. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 1, at 201.
302. The term "intraenterprise transaction" is technically more accurate since not
all of the components of the MNE are distinct corporate entities; nonetheless, the term
"intercompany transaction" is commonly used in this context. The two terms will be
used interchangeably throughout this Article and will refer to transactions between
two corporations within the MNE, or between a corporation and a branch, or between
two branches of the Mr>.TE.
303. J. GREENE &: N. DUERR, lNTERCOMPANY TRANSACOONS IN THE MuLnNAnONAL
FIRM 21 (1970) (survey by the National Industrial Conference Board) [hereinafter J.
GREENE 8: N. DUERR].
304. D. ZENOFF 8: J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 427-30 (1969)
[hereinafter D. ZENOFF &: J. ZWICK]. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
305. D. ZENOFF &: J. ZWICK, supra note 304, at 427-30.
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MNE's transfer prices and seek to substitute the price at which the
goods would have been sold to outsiders.306 Although the potential
abuses of intercompany sales have been recognized, empirical evidence documenting the actual use of the transfer-price mechanism to
shift profits between countries is vague and contradictory.307
The propensity to use intercompany sales to allocate income may
be dependent on the size of an enterprise. Thus, smaller firms may
lack the international experience or be so decentralized that the
coordination necessary to avoid taxes is Iacking.308 Medium-size
firms, large enough to possess the requisite planning sophistication,
are generally sufficiently centralized to develop the system necessary
for such a tax avoidance strategy.309 While the incidence of intercompany sales by these MNEs is not inconsequential, national governments are understandably more concerned with the large MNEs
that are economically more important than the other two groups}310
A number of factors reveal that the large MNEs may not be able to
engage in widespread effective use of intercompany sales to manipulate allocation of income. First, at some point the MNE becomes so
large that effective coordination is impossible.311 It has already been
noted that very large MNEs are decentralizing in order to retain the
necessary sensitivity to localized markets;312 this same decentralization makes it difficult to pursue any widespread policy of intercompany sales to circumvent tax laws. Second, even if sophisticated
managerial and financial tools would permit such a program, the
MNE, with its substantial investment in the host country, has a
strong incentive not to jeopardize its relationship with that country's
government.313 Third, although :financial manipulation can result
in large dollar saving-s, "such saving-s are small in relation to the
earning-s received from capitalizing on [its] special strengths such
as technical know-how, managerial and marketing expertise, or
capacity to raise large sums of money."814
306. J. GREENE & N. DuERR, supra note 303, at 21-24.
307. See generally id. It has been suggested that the use of these manipulative devices has been overestimated. Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the
Consequences, 6 CoLUM. J. WoRLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1971, at 59, 62 [hereinafter StobaughJ.
These observations were based on the Harvard Business School Study of the MNE.
308. See Stobaugh, supra note 307, at 59.
309. See id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra.
313. Stobaugh, supra note 307, at 62.
314. Id.
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b. The response of nation-states to tax avoidance schemes of
the multinational enterprise. The attitude taken by nation-states
through their legislatures and courts in the international context
mirrors the diversity of techniques used in the domestic context. The
experience of the United States and the United Kingdom are illustrative. The United States Tax Court has held that a foreign corporation that is merely a conduit could not avail itself of an otherwise
applicable tax treaty,315 yet that same court refused to disregard the
corporate entity of foreign subsidiaries that were found to be
viable business entities-despite the fact that they were created in
tax haven countries in order to reduce taxes. 316 This partial disregard
of the foreign entity could have been achieved under other tax
principles, such as allocation of a portion of the subsidiary's income
to the parent corporation. Such an allocation of the income of related corporations is possible under present statutory authority "in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income"317
of each entity; taxable income will be determined as if the taxpayer
had dealt with the other member of the enterprise at arm's length.318
315. Aileen Indus. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971). The court held that interest paid to a Honduras corporation by a United States corporation organized to collect such interest on behalf of a Bahamian corporation, was not exempt from United
States withholding tax under the United States-Honduras income tax treaty. See Jo•
hansson v. United· States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964), for an attempt by a Swedish
individual to avail himself of the United States-Swiss tax treaty by organizing a Swiss
corporation.
316. In Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968), a controlled Swiss company was
held to be a viable corporate entity notwithstanding the fact that it was organized to
reduce taxes on oil income under the United States-Swiss tax treaty. In Johnson Bronze
Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H TAX CT. REP.&: MEM. DEC. ~ 65,281 (Oct. 26, 1965), the
court refused to include the income of a Panamanian selling subsidiary (an intermediate holding company) in the income of the United States parent corporation. The
court upheld the subsidiary's existence as a separate taxable entity on the ground that
it served a bona fide purpose by insulating the parent company from the various risks
of foreign operation, despite the fact that all managerial and clerical work was performed for it by the parent corporation, the subsidiary bad no employees, paid no
salaries, owned no offices or office equipment, and had no warehouse. In Columbian
Rope Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 793 (1964), the court held that undistributed income
of a wholly owned Panamanian subsidiary created by a United States parent for valid
business purposes was not includable in the parent's taxable income, citing /IIoline
Properties as the basis for its decision. The taxable years in question were prior to the
Revenue Act of 1962, which provided that certain types of income of controlled foreign
corporations were to be included in the income of the United States parent in the year
that the income was earned, even if the income was undistributed. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF
1954, §§ 951-64.
317. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 482. Such a partial allocation of income was made in
Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H TAX CT. REP. &: MEM. DEc. 11 65,281 (Oct.
26, 1965), following the refusal of the court to disregard the corporate form of the foreign subsidiary or to attribute its whole income to the United States parent under the
"assignment of income" doctrine.
318. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(b}(l} (1968).
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The English response to this problem has differed from the
American approach. Early British tax decisions held that business
carried on by subsidiaries incorporated in the United States was in
fact carried on by English parent companies; the subsidiaries were
viewed merely as agents of their English parents.319 Later cases
established that mere ownership of a subsidiary did not assure that
the subsidiary's business was in fact controlled in the United Kingdom. Thus, British courts will recognize the separate corporate
entity of a subsidiary if its business is not in fact managed by the
British parent company,320 unless it is revealed that the subsidiary
is essentially an agent of the parent.321
However, even if the foreign subsidiary is found to be a separate
entity, British tax law will still tax the income of the subsidiary if
it is a "resident" of the United Kingdom. Although a domestic
corporation is defined under United States tax law as a corporation
"created or organized in the United States or under the law of the
United States or of any State or Territory,''322 British case law developed the theory that "a company resides for purposes of income tax
where its real business is carried on . . . . And the real business is
carried on where the central management and control actually
abides." 323 Obviously, the place of management and control does
not necessarily coincide with the country of incorporation. This
judicial test for determining tax residence is now articulated in the
British tax statute.324
Thus, under British law a company may be incorporated in the
United Kingdom but avoid being a resident for tax purposes,325 and
319. Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co., 4 Tax Cas. 41 (C.A. 1899); St. Louis
Breweries, Ltd. v. Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas. Ill (Q.B. 1898); United States Brewing Co. v.
Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas. 17 (Q.B. 1898); Frank Jones Brewing Co. v. Apthorpe, 4 Tax Cas.
6 (Q.B. 1898).
320. Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K.B. 89 (C.A.); Kodak, Ltd.
v. Clark, [1903] I K.B. 505.
321. See Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960] 38 T.C. 712.
322. INT. REv CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(4). The place of incorporation is also provided
by the United States tax treaties as the criterion for citizenship of United States corporations. See, e.g., Treaty with Germany on Double Taxation of Income, July 22, 1954,
art. Il(l)(e), [1954] 3 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133 (effective Dec. 20, 1954).
323. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455, 458 (H.L.).
324. Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970, c. 10, § 482(7). See also Israeli Income Tax Ordinance § I.
325. Egyptian Delta Land & Inv. Co. v. Todd, [1929] A.C. I (H.L.). However, the
United Kingdom Treasury is protected against migration of the corporate management
abroad by a statutory provision making it illegal to move without government consent.
Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970, c. IO, § 482.
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a company incorporated abroad may be subject to British taxes.326
Generally speaking, if a company's business is controlled by its directors, that business will be considered to be carried on where the
board of directors meets. If the directors of the subsidiary meet
abroad and manage and control its business there, it will not be a
resident of the United Kingdom; but, if the subsidiary's business is
in fact managed and controlled by the board of directors of the
parent company in the United Kingdom, the subsidiary will also be
a resident of the United Kingdom for tax purposes.327
The foregoing tax cases reveal that, while the domestic concepts
of the corporate entity apply to MNEs, additional principles sensitive
to the peculiarities of international business have also evolved to
cope with controlled corporations. Such principles are not necessarily
incompatible with recognition of the separate legal personality of
each related entity, but they do protect the national interests in
financial integrity by looking through corporate form in order to
reach the economic essence of the enterprise. Thus, the British ascertain the locus of "control" and "management" as the determinative
factor of tax liability, and thereby reach certain enterprises that
might escape American tax. The United States moved to protect its
financial interest in 1962 by amending the Internal Revenue Code
to provide that income earned by American-controlled tax haven
companies would be taxed to American stockholders in the year
earned, rather than postponing taxation until remittance of income
to the United States.328 In addition, the United States has vigorously
enforced its statutory authorization, by reallocation of income among
related entities, to prevent manipulation of income.329
This brief survey of the responses by two countries to the tax
problems caused by the MNE demonstrates the desperate attempt
being made by nation-states to thwart tax avoidance. The law in this
area remains uncertain as countries continue the search for a satisfactory regulatory scheme.
326. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455 (HL.).
In a particular instance, a company may be found to be a resident of more than one
country if its management and control are so divided. See Swedish Cent. Ry. , .. Thomp•
son, [1925] A.C. 495 (H.L.).
327. Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960] A.C. 351 (H.L.) (subsidiaries incorporated
in Kenya were held to be residents of the United Kingdom).
328. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64. See Tillinghast, United States Income Taxa•
tion of Foreign Source Income: A Survey of the Provisions and Problems, in 29 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX 1 (1971). See text accompanying notes 175-77 supra.
329. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482. A somewhat similar provision of the British
Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 19'70, c. 10, § 485, has not been vigorously en•
forced.
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2. The Corporate Entity as a Limitation
on Antitrust Regulation
a. Intercorporate arrangements. The interconnected corporate
network of the MNE provides interesting conceptual and practical
problems in the restrictive practices and antitrust field. It is in this
area that the clash between the form of business enterprise and the
underlying economic unity is clearest. When recently presented with
a territorial division agreement between a foreign parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiaries in different member states, which
probably would have violated the antitrust provisions of the EEC
Treaty agreement if it had been between unrelated companies, the
Commission of the European Common Market nevertheless approved
it.830 The Commission viewed the MNE as a single economic entity
despite the separate legal entities used to conduct its business.331 Emphasizing the control by the parent,332 the Commission concluded
that "[u]nder these circumstances, it cannot be expected that one part
of this entity--even though it has a separate legal personality-will
compete with the parent company."3 33
Last year, the EEC Commission applied the same theory to other
MNEs such as the American-based Eastman Kodak Company.334 The
Commission held:
'Where the subsidiaries concerned, as in this case, depend exclusively and completely on their parent company and where this parent
330. Christiani & Nielsen N.V., 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/ 12 (1969), [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1f 9308 ijune 18, 1969). The decision
involved a Danish-based MNE with wholly owned subsidiaries in several EEC countries.
331. The Commission was aware of the economic attributes of the MNE and the
presence of this new business form of conducting transnational business. It stated:
For reasons of management, this enterprise, whose activities are international,
formed subsidiaries in various countries rather than establish branches or agencies.
What is involved here is an element of market strategy that does not result in the
conclusion that, in this case, a wholly-owned subsidiary is an economic entity that
can compete with its parent company.
12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH Cow.r.
MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659.
332. Furthermore, Christiani & Nielsen, Copenhagen, has a right to appoint the
managers of Christiani & Nielsen, The Hague, and to give its subsidiary instructions that it must follow. Christiani & Nielsen, The Hague, is therefore an integral
part of the economic whole of Christiani & Nielsen group.
The division of markets provided for in the agreement fbetween the parent and
the subsidiary] is, therefore, only a divfaion of labor within the same economic
entity.
12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH Cow.r.
MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659.
333. 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/at 14, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. CJ 9308, at 8659.
334. 13 E.E.C. J.O. L147/24, [New Developments] 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. CJ 9378
(July 2, 1972).
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company effectively exercises its power of supervision by giving exact
instructions, it is impossible for the subsidiaries to act independently
of each other in the areas which the parent company controls.835
Accordingly, when the MNE affiliates in fact constitute a single economic entity, intra-MNE arrangements do not violate the EEC law
as long as they do not involve restrictive arrangements with unrelated
third parties.836 But, MNEs that decentralize their marketing decisions and, despite the legal control over the subsidiaries, do not instruct affiliates as to marketing and pricing behavior, might still be
subject to the antitrust laws in their intercorporate dealings; the
reason for such a distinction is that such affiliates might be viewed
and expected to act as competitors.337
Whether the United States would apply this single enterprise
theory is highly questionable. Various statements by the courts reveal
a preoccupation with corporate form. In a recent illustrative case,
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,338 a parent
corporation and its subsidiaries were charged with restraints of trade.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that all the
parties were part of a "single business entity"339 and therefore no
conspiracy existed as a matter of law. Citing its earlier decision in
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,340 the Supreme Court
reversed and held that
since respondents Midas and International [the subsidiary and the
parent] availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through
separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities.341
In Timken, the Court had announced that "[t]he fact that there is
common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does
335. 13 E.E.C. J.O. Ll47/at 25, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM.

11 9378, at 8819.

MKT.

REP.

336. Therefore, the sales conditions agreed upon between Kodak companies and
their various buyers did not come within the scope of the antitrust provisions of Article
85 of the EEC Treaty. 13 E.E.C. J.O. LI47 /at 24-25, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM.
MKT. REP. 11 9378, at 8819-20.
337. For the EEC policy in this context, see generally Dietz, Enforcement of AntiTrust Laws in the EEC, 6 INTL. LAw. 742 (1972); Forcione, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Under the Antitrust Regulations of the Common Market, 25 Bus. LAW. 1419 (1972).
338. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
339. 376 F.2d 629, 699 (7th Cir. 196'7).
340. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
341. 392 U.S. at 141-42.
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not liberate them from the impact of antitrust laws."342 A distinction
the Court had failed to recognize was that Perma Life involved in
reality a single business entity whereas Timken concerned an international joint-venture.343
It is submitted that enforcement agencies and courts should recognize that the various components of an 11NE cannot be expected
to behave as if they were unrelated. The separate corporate personality of each unit of the MNE should not be determinative if in a
business and economic sense the entities act as a unified enterprise;
to treat an MNE differently depending on whether its business is
conducted through incorporated or unincorporated units 344 is an
unjustified deference to form over substance.345 It is unrealistic to
expect--or require-wholly owned affiliates to compete with each
other as unrelated companies.346 This is particularly true when the
motivation for incorporation serves a valid commercial purpose, such
as compliance with foreign law requiring local incorporation, a
342. Ml U.S. at 598. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).

343. The court of appeals indicated that Perma Life's affiliates did not hold themselves out as competitors but rather as related members of the same enterprise. 376
F.2d at 699. This is an important point since related corporations that hold themselves
out as competitors should be subject to the antitrust rules in their intercorporate dealings. Kiefer-Stewart involved such a factual arrangement. Perma Life was decided on the
pleadings, and at any rate the decision could be justified on antitrust theories other
than the intraenterprise restrictive arrangements. See 392 U.S. at 142.
344. The United States-based Timken Company acquired complete ownership of its
foreign subsidiaries and converted them into unincorporated divisions. At that stage the
United States Department of Justice approved Timken's intracorporate business arrangements. Markley, How Timken Coordinates Its Worldwide Manufacturing and
Marketing, EXPORT TRADE, April 25, 1960, at 10. A change of attitude by the Justice
Department concerning the arrangements between wholly owned subsidiaries and their
companies would be advisable, as long as these entities behave like members of a single
enterprise, since they in fact all belong to the same MNE. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Hawaii Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970).
345. As Justice Jackson correctly noted in his dissent in Timken at 341 U.S. at 606:
It is admitted that if Timken had, within its own corporate organization, set up
separate departments to operate plants in France and Great Britain, as well as in
the United States, "that would not be a conspiracy. You must have two entities
to have a conspiracy." Thus, although a single American producer, of course, would
not compete with itself, either abroad or at home, and could determine prices and
allot territories with the same effect as here, that would not be a violation of the
Act because a corporation cannot conspire with itself . . . . The doctrine now
applied to foreign commerce is that foreign subsidiaries organized by an American
corporation are "separate persons," and any arrangement between them and the
parent corporation to do that which is legal for the parent alone is an unlawful
conspiracy. I think that result places too much weight on labels.
346. ANTITRUST I.Aws, supra note 178, at 36 (1955).
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managerial decision to reduce risk, or compliance with particular tax
regulations. As The Attorney General's National Committee To
Study the Antitrust Laws admitted in 1955-only four years after

Timken:
The use of subsidiaries is generally induced by normal, prudent
business considerations. No social objective would be attained were
subsidiaries enjoined from agreeing not to compete with each other
or with their parent. To demand internal competition within and
between the members of a single business unit is to invite chaos without promotion of the public welfare.3 47

b. Antitrust jurisdiction over the multinational enterprise. Although the United States has not applied the enterprise theory to
e:xempt an MNE from the substantive reach of the antitrust laws, it
has applied an analogous theory to subject the parent company of the
MNE to local jurisdiction despite the fact that the anticompetitive
activities were arranged in the home country and in fact only carried
on by the foreign entities of the MNE. Until recently, the United
States was the only country to apply this so-called "effect" theory,
under which it has been able to apply American law to the activities
abroad of foreign companies. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America/148 the famous Alcoa case, Judge Learned Hand asserted that
it is "settled law ... that any State may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
347. Id. at 34. See, e.g., United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas.
69,619 (N.D. Okla. 1960); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty.
First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 182 (1969); Willis &: Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20 (1968). See
also Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Allan Ready Mix
Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) ,r 73,955
(D.C. Tenn. April 13, 1972). But see Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J.A. Buchroeder
&: Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
Wilbur Fugate, Chief Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice, stated recently that Timken is still good law but that the recommendations of the 1955 Attorney General's Committee should be followed in regard to
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries of United States MNEs and activities based on corporate control, but not to those based on contractual agreements. Remarks at the Multinational Enterprise Seminar of the World Trade Institute, New York, Oct. 25, 1972,
5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 50,152, at 55.,258-59. He concluded that
[u]nder present U.S. antitrust law, a U.S. company may usually exercise its control
over a foreign subsidiary to direct the subsidiary in matters of pricing and sales
areas. The antitrust laws, however, may apply to intra-corporate dealings where
third parties are injured or monopolization is present.
Id. at 55,262. The EEC Commission gave its negative clearance to an intra-MNE express
agreement not to compete in Christiani &: Nielsen N.V., 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll65/12 (1969).
See notes 330-33 supra and accompanying text.
l!48. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

,r
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that has consequences within its borders which the State reprehends ...." 349 Although the full reach of this theory is uncertain,
the United States courts have applied this theory whenever the foreign corporation intended to affect United States commerce and such
adverse effect has occurred.3 M
Although American law has not been specifically addressed to
MNEs, most cases involving extraterritorial application of the United
States antitrust law have dealt with restrictive activities conducted
abroad by foreign companies that were affiliated with local corporations. For example, United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, Inc.351 dealt with concerted anticompetitive
conduct abroad by Swiss parent companies that controlled their
United States subsidiaries. Even the Alcoa case involved related foreign and American corporations.352 However, the United States
courts have not expressly invoked the enterprise theory to hold foreign companies liable for antitrust violations for the actions of their
local affiliates or vice versa. Instead, they have proceeded on the basis
of the effect of the foreign restrictive activities on domestic competition.353
349. 148 F.2d at 443. The controversy that has raged ever since this decision suggests that the law is hardly "settled." See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT
OF THE FIFI'Y-FIRST CONFERENCE 304-592 (1964), esp. Riedweg, The Extra-Territorial
Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation-Jurisdiction and International Law, id.
at 357, Oliver, The Harmonization of Laws and the Development of Principles for the
Resolution of Conflicts of Enforcement Jurisdiction, id. at 511; COMMON MARKET AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST 364-416 (J. Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter J. Rahl].
350. J. Rahl, supra note 349, at 86. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) adopted, with several modifications, the "effect"
theory as a basis for substantive international jurisdiction.
351. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962), order
modified, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1J 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1965).
352. The foreign company "Limited" was organized in Canada to take over the
properties of the United States "Alcoa" that were located abroad, Limited issued all its
common stock to Alcoa's common shareholders. 148 F .2d at 439. There were several
indications that Limited and Alcoa did not deal with each other at arm's length and
that Alcoa took part in the formation of "Alliance,'' the foreign cartel in question.
148 F.2d at 440. One commentator s~ested that Judge Hand's effect theory was an
attempt "to reverse, on grounds of law, a result below which he found unpalatable but
did not want to remand for lengthy retrial on the facts." K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS A.BROAD 72 (1958). The questionable point of fact was whether
Alcoa actually did participate in the foreign cartel; the lower court had found that
Alcoa had not. In addition to the element of common control and the fact that Alcoa
and Limited were affiliated companies, Limited's international headquarters was in
New York, not Canada. Id. at 73.
353. Thus, in the noted Watchmakers case the court applied the effect theory stating that "a United States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts, if,
as in the case at bar, such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect
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By contrast, the EEC Court of Justice, in the landmark Dyestuff
decisions,354 invoked the enterprise theory in order to subject foreignbased MNEs to its jurisdiction. The Commission in this case355 had
fined the Swiss companies-Ciba, Geigy, and Sandoz-and the British
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), along with some EEC companies
because of the concerted price-fixing of dyestuffs within the Common
Market. The Court of Justice upheld the Commission on the applicability of the EEC antitrust law to the foreign companies. The Commission and the court fined the foreign parent companies, rather than
their Common Market subsidiaries that were the distributors of
dyestuffs within the European Community and had formally performed the anticompetitive activities.
ICI contended vigorously that it had not performed these activities; ICI asserted that they were performed by its EEC subsidiaries.
The court properly rejected this contention because of facts that
revealed a highly controlled multinational corporate structure. The
court stated:
The fact that the subsidiary [of ICI] has its own legal personality
does not serve to rule out the possibility that its conduct is attributable to the parent company. This could be the case where the
subsidiary, even though it has its own legal personality, does not independently determine its own market behavior but essentially follows the instructions given it by the parent company [ICI]. If the
subsidiary does not in fact have autonomy in determining its course
upon our foreign and domestic commerce." 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas,)
,J 70,600, at 77,457. In the same litigation, eight years earlier, the district court had held
that the Swiss parent companies were present in the United States for service of process
purposes through the activities of their joint American subsidiaries. 113 F. Supp. 40,
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
354. Separate decisions relating to nine companies were released together. Imperial
Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. tj[ 8161 Guly 14, 1972); Badische Anilin-und Soda-Fabrik AG v. Commission
of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8162 Guly 14, 1972); Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. tj[ 8163 Guly 14, 1972); J.R. Geigy v. Commission of the European Communities,
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8164 Guly 14, 1972); Sandoz AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8165 Guly 14, 1972); S.A. Fran~ise des
matieres colorantes v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT.
REP. ,i 8166 Guly 14, 1972); Casella Farbwerke Mainkur AG v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. tj[ 8167 (July 14, 1972); Farbwerke Hoechst
v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. tj[ 8168 Guly 14,
1972); Azienda Colori Nazionali v. Commission of the European Communities, 2 CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,i 8169 Guly 14, 1972).
In reference to the jurisdictional issue, the cases are basically the same; thus specific
citations will be given only to the ICI case.
355. 12 E.E.C. J.O. Ll95/ll (1969), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,I 9314 Guly 24, 1969).
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of conduct on the market, the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph I
[of the EEC Treaty], is inapplicable to the relationship between it
and the parent cbmpany with which it forms an economic unity.
Since an affiliated group, so structured forms a unity, the parent company can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible for the
actions of the subsidiary.arm

The parent company had both the legal control over the subsidiaries and the effective organizational control over certain activities of the subsidiaries.357 The decision-making power with respect to
the pertinent conduct of the subsidiaries was centralized at the
parent's level and had not been delegated: "The plaintiff [ICI] could
decisively influence the pricing policy of its subsidiaries in the Common Market and it did in fact make use of this power to give instructions on the occasion of the three price increases in question here."358
Accordingly, the illegal conduct within the Common Market was
viewed as conduct of the enterprise as a whole--conduct of a single
economic unit consisting of both the parent company and the subsidiary, which were recognized as distinct legal entities-and attributed to the parent that originated the conduct.359
The court looked at the entire corporate network of the MNE to
determine where the authority to make the pertinent pricing policy
decisions resided. Once it was established that this power lay with
the parent company and that "[b]y availing itself of its power of
direction over its subsidiaries established in the Common Market,
plaintiff [the parent ICI] was able to apply its decisions on that [EEC]
market,"360 it followed that the prohibited practices were therefore
356. 15 E.E.C. J.O. - , 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.

11

8161, at 8031 (emphasis added).

357. See text accompanying notes 152-60 supra for these two dimensions of control.
358. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031.
359. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1J 8161, at 8031. The British government protested the Commission's original assertion of jurisdiction stating:
[T]he separate legal personalities of a parent company and its subsidiary should be
respected. Such concepts as "enterprise entity" when applied for the purpose of
asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent company by reason of the
presence within the jurisdiction of a subsidiary (and a foreign subsidiary by
reason of the presence of its parent company) are contrary to sound legal principle in that they disregard the distinction of personality between parent and
subsidiary.
Statement of Principles According To Which, in the View of the United Kingdom
Government, Jurisdiction May Be Exercised over Foreign Corporations in Anti-trust
Matters, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFI'Y·FOURTH CONFERENCE
184 (1970).
360. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH COMM, MKT. REP. 11 8161, at 8031.
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"carried out directly within the Common Market"361 by the parent
ICI. As a result, the court flatly rejected the plea of lack of EEC
jurisdiction raised by ICI.362 The EEC thus recognized, for antitrust
purposes, the local business operation of ICI as an integral part of
the larger enterprise controlled abroad. The court employed the
enterprise theory3 63 to attribute the acts of the subsidiaries to the
controlling corporation of the enterprise-the parent company.
By invoking the enterprise theory, the court held that the activities of the foreign parent company were carried out within and not
outside the Common Market. In so holding, the court avoided the
discussion of the controversial effect theory, namely, whether actions
performed outside the EEC by foreign companies are subject to EEC
jurisdiction solely because these actions had effects within the Common Market. Accordingly, the court did not have to respond to the
lengthy arguments by ICI, supported by the expert opinion of Professor Jennings, that basing jurisdiction solely on the effect theory is
contrary to international law.364 It is submitted that the court rightly
rejected the contention that ICI could not be considered as having
acted ·within the EEC through the activities of its subsidiaries in the
Community.365 It is true that not every activity of wholly controlled
subsidiaries may be imputed to the parent; but, notwithstanding the
separate legal personalities of the subsidiaries, activities that the
evidence reveals were in fact performed according to the instructions
of the parent may be attributed to the parent under the enterprise
theory.aoo
The court's decision is consistent with earlier Commission decisions that the antitrust prohibitions are not applicable to the rela361. 15 E.E.C.
362. 15 E.E.C.

J.O. -,
J.0. -,

2 CCH COMM.

MKT.

REP. ,i 8161, at 8031.

2 CCH COMM.

MKT.

REP. 11 8161, at 8031.

363. See notes 265-89 supra and accompanying text.
364. 15 E.E.C.

J.O. -,

2 CCH COMM.

MKT.

REP. ,J 8161, at 8005-06.

365. 15 E.E.C. J.O. -, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,J 8161, at 8005-06. The effect theory
should be considered primarily in cases involving foreign companies without local
affiliates, or when the members of the MNE do not actually comprise a single economic
unit with respect to the activities under consideration. However, most cases have
involved local members of MNEs in a highly controlled structure. See notes 351-53
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the enterprise theory may be properly applied to their activities.
366. See notes 270-71 supra and accompanying text. As the Commission put it before
the court: "The thing to be determined here is that as to the practices involved here
plaintiff's subsidiaries were mere tools, so that in competitive relations with third
parties they appear to be an extension of I.C.I. in the Common Market." 15 E.E.C,
J.0. -, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,J 8161, at 8007,
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tions between the parent of the MNE and its subsidiaries as long as
they in fact comprise a single economic enterprise.367 "Thus if the
affiliated-group relationship can have favorable effects for enterprises
in the application of Community cartel law, it would also have to be
recognized that this relationship can also have unfavorable effects."368
E. New Legal Models
The uncertainty generated by judicial and legislative attempts to
recognize the underlying economic unit of a multicorporate firm and
to prevent frustration of national policies has led governments and
international businesses to seek a more satisfactory legal framework
around which MNEs may be constructed. Two recent developments
have great relevance to this problem: the West German Law of Related Companies, and the proposals for a European company law.
I. The German Law of Related Companies

Passed in 1965, the German Law of Related Companies, the Konzernrecht,369 is a regulatory scheme that preserves the concept of the
enterprise as a network of multiple legal entities within a single
managerial framework. Nevertheless, the law is a good example of
the needed shift in emphasis from the corporate form to the underlying economic enterprise. Like the MNE, the German Konzem is an
economic unit consisting of a group of companies, related by ties of
control extending into the separate legal entities. Whether the law
will be applied to a particular enterprise depends upon actual or
contractual control. Control may therefore be maintained, for example, by a majority of votes370 or by a contractual relationship by
which an A.G. subordinates its managerial functions to the direction
of another company or undertakes to transfer its total profits to another (the controlling) company.
Under this law, a Konzern is formed if a controlling and one or
more controlled business units are subject to the centralized management of the controlling unit,371 or if legal entities are subject to
367. See notes 330-33 supra and accompanying text,
368. 15 E.E.C. J.O. - , 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 8161, at 80ll (referring to defendant's rejoinder).
369. AKTG (1965). See text accompanying notes 194-99 supra for a discussion of twotiered management under the AKTG.
370. AKTG § 16 (1965).
871. AKTG § 18(1) (1965).
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centralized management even though one does not control the
other.372 The Konzern thus includes (1) companies that are parties to
a control agreement,373 under which separate companies agree in
advance to be subject to the management of another-the controlling
-company,374 and (2) integrated companies.3711 Integrated companies
stand in a closer corporate relationship, even though there is no full
merger eliminating the separate legal personalities of the companies.
Instead, the integrated companies preserve their distinct juristic
identities, although they constitute a single economic unit. Such integration becomes effective when a resolution to integrate into the
German parent is passed by the shareholders of its wholly owned
subsidiary and is approved by the shareholders of the parent.376
When there is a control agreement or a wholly owned integrated
subsidiary, the law recognizes the power of the controlling company
to direct the controlled companies, which may include instructions
that result in particularized decisions that are detrimental to the
latter, and permits the exercise of such power as long as directives
are beneficial to the controlling entity or to the group of related
companies (enterprise or Konzern) as a whole.377 However, the directors and officers of the controlling company may be liable for breach
of the duty of due care in managing the controlled company.378 Thus,
the Konzernrecht correctly perceives the shift of decision-making
power from the controlled to the controlling entity pursuant to the
control agreement or integration.379 Such a shift properly characterizes the decision-making process of many MNEs in important
business determinations.380
The rationale of the law is to protect the shareholders of the
controlled companies of the enterprise, as well as outsiders who do
business with or otherwise invest in one of the enterprise's units.381
372. AKTG § 18(2) (1965).
373. AKTG §§ 18(1), 291 (1965).
374. AKTG § 291(1) (1965). A control agreement is but one type of "enterprise
agreement" regulated by the Act. See AKTG §§ 291-92 (1965).
375. AKTG §§ 18(1), 319 (1965).
376. AKTG §§ 319(1)-(2) (1965). Such an integration is recorded in the Commercial
Register. AKTG §§ 319(3)-(4) (1965).
377. AKTG §§ 308, 323 (1965).
378. AKTG §§ 309-10, 323 (1965).
379. See AKTG § 308 (1965).
380. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
381. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 105-07.

March 1973]

Private Multinational Enterprise

795

Thus, notwithstanding the fiction of the corporate veil, the controlling company may be liable to the controlled company's creditors or
minority shareholders. The liabilities imposed depend on the type of
control and whether there is a control agreement. Disregarding the
corporate form, the law protects the minority shareholders and creditors from impairment of the controlled company's capital and profits.382 Indeed, the law goes even further by imposing liability upon
the controlling entity for losses sustained by the controlled company
in certain circumstances.383
Where there is no control agreement or integration, a company
which in effect controls another company, through stock ownership
or otherwise, may not cause the controlled company to act or to refrain from acting to its disadvantage without compensation.384 Absent
a control agreement or an integration, the law forces the affiliated
companies to behave like unrelated companies. The law protects a
controlled company against exploitation of its resources without adequate compensation, and requires extensive disclosures by the controlling company.385 The law requires dissemination of relevant
financial information to the shareholders and the public, particularly
with respect to intercompany transactions within the group of related
companies.386
The increased emphasis on disclosure of information is further
reflected by requirements imposed on entities whenever they acquire
more than twenty-five per cent of all the shares of a German stock
company. A business owning this requisite percentage must notify
the issuer of this fact in writing; the investing entity must also notify
the public if it acquires a majority interest or if its investment falls
below the earlier reported quantum. 387 These disclosure requirements are intended to protect shareholders, and failure to comply
382. See, e.g., AKTG §§ 302, 309-10, 322(i) (1965).
383. AKTG §§ 300-03, 324 (1965). In addition, a control agreement or an agreement to
transfer profits must provide for fair compensation to, and for an offer to acquire the
shares for adequate consideration from, the minority shareholders of the controlled
company. AKTG §§ 304-05 (1965).
384. AKTG § 311 (1965).
385. AKTG §§ 311, 312-15, 31'7-18 (1965).
386. AKTG § 312 (1965). See AKTG § 329 (1965) requiring consolidated financial statements and annual business reports of integrated companies or companies subject to a
control agreement. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 105; Haskell, The New
West German Law of "Related Business Units", 24 Bus. I.Aw. 421 (1969); ICC 263, supra
note 166, at 36-37.
387. AKTG §§ 20-21 (1965).
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results in severe consequences: the controlling shareholder's rights
in the issuer company are suspended.388 These disclosure requirements apply to any MNE that holds the requisite percentage of shares
of a German stock company.389
Beyond the disclosure requirements, the substantive rules of related entities may also be relevant to the MNE. Of course, the MNE
is affected by German law to the extent that an MNE's operations
in Germany involve a group of companies related because of stock
ownership. But, when a non-German company is a party to a contract
of control with a German stock company, it has been suggested that
the Konzernrecht may be applied since the German company is subject to the direction of a related (although in this instance foreign)
company.390 Such a situation raises very interesting questions since
when this control agreement is present, the very dangers of subverting the interests of the subsidiary in favor of the controlling entityconcerns that prompted the passage of the Konzernrecht--exist. Will
the German law permit the subsidiaries to comply with directives
from an American parent corporation, which is required by the
United States government to comply ·with American economic regulations and policies, under the theory that it promotes the interest
of the MNE as a whole? Will, for example, German law recognize
the attempted extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws
or prohibitions against trading with an enemy of the United States?
Perhaps the Germans will carefully balance the interests of the subsidiary, its shareholders, and creditors with the economic consequences to the MNE of noncompliance with American laws.391 But, in
Fruehauf v. Massardy, 892 a French court took into account only the
interests of the French subsidiary and compelled it to fulfill a contract although the subsidiary had been ordered not to do so by its
American parent. The conflict arose in circumstances not unlike the
388. AKTG §§ 20·21 (1965).
389. AKTG §§ 20-21 (1965). H. KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONAL UNTERNEHMEN DEllT•
SCHEN GESSELSCHAFl'SRECHT 285 (1971) [hereinafter H. KOPPENSTEINER]. There are other
general rules concerning related companies, such as the limitations imposed by AKTG
§§ 56, 71 (1965) on the acquisition of shares by a controlled company as a means of
guaranteeing that an entity does not acquire its own shares, and the voting rights
provisions of .AKTG § 136 (1965), but they appear to apply only to German companies.
See H. KOPPENSTEINER, supra, at 286, 291.
390. H. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 389, at 309-21.
391. Id. at 319; Rehbinder, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European Legal Point of View, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 95 (1969) [hereinafter Rehbinder].
~92. [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II 14,274 bis (Cour d'appel Paris).
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above hypothetical questions: The French subsidiary was supplying
products to Red China-acts permitted under French law but counter
to American regulations under the Trading with the Enemy Act.393
This sensitive area of conflicting national policies and the reach
of economic regulatory controls of nation-states is particularly appropriate for intergovernmental cooperation and resolution. The premise of the Konzernrecht, that the needs of the business enterprise
must be balanced with the protection required by creditors and
minority stockholders of the subsidiary, may serve as the underlying
rationale of an international agreement. Thus, reasonable limitations
could be placed on the nature and scope of a parent's directives, or a
method of compensation for affected groups in the host country could
be designed for those occasions when the interests of the subsidiary
and the MNE do not coincide.
The issues raised by German-based MNEs are less difficult; it has
been suggested that most of the specific provisions directed toward
related entities will not be applicable because foreign subsidiariesnot German subsidiaries-will be affected by the actions of Germanbased MNEs.394 Whether the interests of those subsidiaries will be
protected in other countries will depend on the internal laws of those
other countries, including, for example, such doctrines as fiduciary
duties and liabilities of majority stockholders under American case
law.
2. The Proposals for a European Company Law

A notable attempt to recognize the multinational commercial
enterprise as a single legal entity in a regional context is the
393. In reaching its decision to appoint a temporary administrator to perform the
contract, the court emphasized that the contract was with an exporter who, under
French law, would have been able to recover treble damages for the breach of contract
against Fruehauf-France, putting it out of business and destroying 600 jobs in the
process. The contract was performed and the subsidiary was returned to its owners.
The court did not base its decision on public or private international law; nor did it
find that the United States had exceeded its jurisdiction in applying its Trading with
the Enemy Act; nor did it attempt to evaluate the American interests vis-a-vis the
French interests in relation to the issues at stake. Apparently the decision was solely
based on concepts of French corporation law. See Craig, Application of the Trading
with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on
Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1970).
Compare Fruehauf with Judgment of Dec. 21, 1960, 34 BGHZ 169, in which the
German Federal Court held the American embargo policy to be in concurrence with
West German policy. See Rehbinder, supra note 391, at 111.
~!){,

:fl.

1\-0PPENSTEINER,

supra note 389, at 26(;,
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"European Company" concept. Proposals for a supranational company law in Europe have been under consideration by the EEC as a
means to encourage the extension of companies across national
borders. It appears to be in the common interest of all members of
the EEC to facilitate the growth of business operations on a larger
and more efficient scale than has been possible to date under the
operation of nation-based company laws.895 In March 1965, France
submitted a memorandum to the EEC Commission suggesting the
creation of commercial companies on a European scale.896 One year
later, the EEC published a memorandum describing three alternatives that would give impetus to the creation of such companies:
harmonization of the corporate laws of the EEC member nations; a
uniform European company law to be introduced in all EEC member
nations separately; and, a convention allowing establishment of such
companies under a supranational law.897
The EEC invited Professor Sanders of Rotterdam to draft a
statute embodying the third alternative. Although the draft,898 dealing solely with company law and not with the laws of related fields
such as taxation, was finished late in 1966, it was not until June 1970,
that the Commission submitted the proposed Law for European
Companies to the Council of Ministers; the draft submitted contained the Commission's refinement of the Sanders draft, including
rules of tax law.899 The current proposal is by no means final, and
395. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 364-87; EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AssoCIATION,
COMPANY LAW 13-17 (1970) [hereinafter COMPANY LAw]; EEC Commission Memo, No.
P-1/66, Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9081 (Jan. 1966). See also EEC
Commission Press Release No. I.P. (70) 148, U.S. Investments in the EEC, Aug. 18,
1970, &: Paper from documentation europeene 1970, Serie Syndicate europeene, No. 9
[New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9387, at 8841; EEC Press Release,
April I, 1970, Outline for Common Market's Industrial Policy [New Developments] 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9354.
396. French Proposal for a European Type Company, 1966 REv. TRIM. DROlT EUR.
409. An English translation appears in [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder]
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9025 (May 25, 1965) [hereinafter French Proposal].
397. EEC Commission Memo, A. European-Type Company, 1966 Bull. E.E.C. Supp.
9/10, [1965-1969 New Developments Transfer Binder] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9100
(May 3, 1966).
398. P. SANDERS, EUROPEAN STOCK CORPORATION (transl. CCH 1969) [hereinafter
Sanders Draft].
399. See PROPOSED STATUTE FOR THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, 3 Bull. E.E.C. (Supp. Aug.
1970) [hereinafter PROPOSED STATUTE]. See generally E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 424-82;
COMPANY LAw, supra note 395, at 13-17; Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation,
1970 J. Bus. L. 156, 1971 id. 167; Fornaiser Toward a European Company, 4 CoLUM.
J. WoRI.D Bus., Sept.-Oct. 1969, at 51; Mann, The European Company, 19 INTL.
COMP. L.Q. 468 (1970); Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 CoMM. MKT.
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further changes are expected.400 Although the European company
(Societas Europa, "S.E.") creates some problems that make it inapplicable to all MNEs, many MNEs would find it desirable to operate
in the EEC in this novel business form. In addition, the adoption of
this corporate form might serve as the impetus for further development of laws responsive to MNEs in general and as a model law for
legislatures in their consideration of further alignment of the corporation laws of the EEC members.401 The form of company contemplated by the European company proposal would be truly
supranational. The company would register with the European commercial register at the Court of Justice402 and would be regulated by
one legal system of European corporation law.403 The uniformity of
the interpretation and application of the law relating to European
companies would be assured by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities,404 which would construe the articles of association,
interpret the European law, and determine relevant issues governed
by the statute but not provided for expressly.405 In this respect the
European company law is contrary to the French proposal that had
sought uniform national laws to be interpreted primarily by domestic courts.406
The European company law addresses the range of questions
ordinarily covered in a corporation statute. Access to the European
company form would be provided for stock companies of a multiL. R.Ev. 29 (1971) [hereinafter Sanders); Schmitthoff, Multinational Companies, 1970
INTL. Bus. LAW 167; Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 4 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 377
(1967); Scholten, The European Company, 5 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 9 (1967); Storm, supra
note 172; Storm, Statute of a Societas Europaea, 5 CoMM. MKT. L. R.Ev. 265 (1967); A
European Company Law in the Making-But Its Opportunity Is Questioned, 7 CoMM.
MKT, 61 (1967); Note, Merger Movements in the Common Market, 10 VA. J. INTL. L. 119
(1969).
400. See EEC Economic and Social Committee, Industry, Research and Technology
Bull. No. 164, [New Developments] 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 11 9538 (1972).
401. See id. at 9202.
402. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 8, 11.
403. The company's legal seat must be located within the EEC. The proposal
provides that the company may have several legal seats. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note
399, art. 5(2). In contrast, the Sanders Draft provided for only one legal seat. Sanders
Draft, supra note 398, § I-4(1). Article 7(2) of the PROPOSED STATUTE provides that
national laws would apply to the MNEs on matters not governed by the PROPOSED
STATUTE.
404. Since the law of the European company will be adopted as a "regulation" under
the EEC Treaty, it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court under section 177 of
the Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77 (1958).
405. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 7(1).
406. French Proposal, supra note 396.
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national character, but not for limited liability companies.407 The
S.E. would be the corporate form resulting from the merger4° 8 of
national stock companies and the form utilized for joint holding or
subsidiary companies.409 European companies would also be eligible
to participate in the formation of another S.E., either by merger or
by establishment of a new holding company or subsidiary.410 However, in every instance at least two of the founders must belong to
different member states of the EEC; and the Commission formally
restricted applicability of the European company form to member
states of the EEC.411
In the internal organization of a European company, stock, issued
as bearer or restricted shares,412 may be voting (one vote per share)418
or nonvoting; however, nonvoting stock is subject to certain limitations.414 The corporate management and control structure would
follow the two-tier German system of a supervisory board and a board
of management.415 Stockholders would elect the supervisory board,
and the supervisory board would in turn select the board of management.416 The majority of the board of management would consist of
407. See PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2. See text accompanying notes 18991 supra for the distinction between stock companies and limited liability companies.
408. Note 2 to PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 2 8: 3 provides: "Merger by
formation of a new company means, in the present context, amalgamation of two or
more stock companies limited by shares to form a new legal entity. The founder
companies cease to exist. [Consequently it] precludes ••• merger by takeover."
409. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2 reads: "Societes anonymes [or a
comparable corporate form] incorporated under the law of a Member State and of
which not less than two are subject to different national laws may establish an S.E. by
merger or by formation of a holding company or joint subsidiary."
410. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 3.
411. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 2. Articles I-2(1), I-3(1) (c)•(d) of the
Sanders Draft would allow corporations formed outside the EEC to act as promoters of
the joint subsidiary in the form of an S.E. See E. STEIN, supra note 147, at 458, for the
"access" problem. In practice, however, there is no significant difference. The foreign
company can use a wholly owned subsidiary within the EEC or obtain the assistance o[
a bank, incorporated within the EEC, for the formation of the SE-joint subsidiary.
Sanders, supra note 399, at 31.
412. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 50. This is the practice in all of the
member states except Italy.
413. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 91(1).
414. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 49(2). The total nominal value of
these shares may not exceed the capital.
415. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 83(c).
416. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 63(1). See text accompanying notes
194-97 supra.
The EEC Commission's recently proposed Fifth Directive on Company Law
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natural persons and citizens of the member states.417 The principle
of codetermination by workers in a European company418 remains
controversial; the Sanders draft proposed to continue codetermination where it already exists but not to introduce it elsewhere.419 The
Commission has attempted a general solution by giving the employees
an option to appoint representatives to the supervisory board.420
The proposal also sets standards for disclosure of the company's
accounts. 421 Following the pattern of the German law,422 the European company law would require related companies to disclose
material financial interests and to issue consolidated statements; in
this manner, the economic and financial relationship between the
parent and subsidiary corporations will be known to interested creditors and investors.423 These interested third parties are protected
under the proposed European company law if any one of the related
companies is a European company. The controlling company is subject to joint and several liability when the creditor has "endeavoured,
and failed, to obtain payment of his debt from the dependent undertaking."424
Many of the problems underlying the European company proposal are directly attributable to the emergence of the MNE. The
Harmonization, which concerns the approximation of national corporate laws in the
EEC, provides for a dual management system consisting of a supervisory board and
management board. Fifth Directive, supra note 209.
417. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 63(2)-(3). If the board of management
consists of only one or two members, then they must all be nationals of member
states. Id.
418. See text accompanying notes 210-33 supra.
419. Sanders Draft, supra note 398, arts. (V-1-1)-(V-1-4).
420. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 137-38. The employees will be entitled
to one third of the members on the board but they may waive this right by a decision
of two thirds of the employees. Id.
The Fifth Directive provides two options for employee participation in management
of companies with 500 or more employees. Under one option, one third of the supervisory board would be appointed by employees. Under the other, the members of the
board would be appointed by the board itself but the employees' representatives could
object to an appointment thereby requiring referral of the appointment to the consideration of an independent body. Fifth Directive, supra note 209.
421. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 150-222. The rules are based on the
draft directive for the harmonization of national legislation on the subject under
article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958).
422• .AK:rG §§ 177, 325-26, 329-38 (1965).
423. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, arts. 150-222. The Fifth Directive also provides for shareholder protection through increased disclosure requirements and general shareholders' meetings. Fifth Directive, supra note 209.
424. PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 239.
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focus of the proposal on the economic realities of modem commercial business, with its disregard of the nation-state corporate form, is
a particularly noteworthy development.426 Acceptance of similar
proposals by markets not as integrated as the EEC will be very difficult. Yet, other legal avenues are available on a multinational basis
to such markets. International agreements and harmonization of
specific regulatory rules and tax laws, which would not focus on corporation law, remain distinct possibilities.426
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that "[t]he multi-national corporation is an economic and political reality of the modem world,"427 the MNE
remains wit4out an adequate legal framework. Courts have only
recently recognized the phenomenon of the MNE. As the International Court of Justice remarked in the highly controversial Barcelona Traction 428 case:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the international
activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which
are often multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first sight appear
surprising that the evolution of the law has not gone further and that
no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the
international plane.429

In the area of corporation law, MNEs do present novel problems
and challenges to the legal systems of nation-states in the long run. In
the foreseeable future, however, concepts traditionally employed in
the domestic setting can be satisfactorily applied to MNEs. Indeed,
the decision of the EEC Court in the Dyestuff cases,430 by its application of the enterprise theory, stands as the prime example of the
appropriate legal response to the MNE phenomenon. Under the
domestically developed enterprise theory,431 disregard of the cor425. See, e.g., PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 399, art. 281 &: note on art. 281.
426. See, e.g., COMPANY LAw, supra note 395, at 18·19.
427. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 3, at 355.
428. Barcelona Traction Light &: Power Co., (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] I.C.J. 3,
reprinted at 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIAI.5 227 (1970), and summarized in 64 AM. J. INTL. L.
653 (1970).
429. [1970] I.C.J. at 34.
430. See text accompanying notes 354-68 supra.
431. See notes 14 &: 263-89 supra and accompanying text.
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porate entity is justified because a corporation is only a fragment of
a larger enterprise that actually conducts the business under consideration. In such a case, a larger corporate entity would be held
financially responsible. Similarly, in a multinational corporate structure, an individual corporate member should be disregarded in order
to reach the larger entity that is actually responsible for the activity
in question. That is not to say that the corporation may be disregarded for all legal purposes. The enterprise theory is applicable
only to those activities that are in fact attributable to the controlling
corporation because · those decisions are in fact centralized in the
international headquarters. Presently, MNEs have decentralized
much of their decision-making from international headquarters to
the national level. Such a delegation of power enables local management to adapt strategies to the market conditions of the local
environment and to the demands of governmental authorities. Consequently, for most legal purposes the local corporations of the MNE
should be the proper object of local legal directives. If the states do
not effectively reach the appropriate unit of the MNE, national policies will be frustrated.
In sum, once legislatures and national authorities are cognizant
of the organizational and control characteristics of MNEs, they can
employ various legal theories to protect national interests. First, complete disregard of the corporate entity is justified in exceptional
circumstances of fraud, evasion of national laws, or when a particular
corporation does not fulfill substantial business functions. This extreme approach is not applicable to operating subsidiaries, but
rather applies, for example, to certain intermediate holding companies typically located in tax haven countries.432 Second, while the
distinct entities of the multiple corporations should be recognized,
certain transactions should nevertheless be attributed to the controlling corporations. The use of this approach will depend on individual circumstances and on the specific structure of the MNE in
question. This partial disregard of the corporate entity is made
possible by ascertaining the location of the MNE's decision-making
power with respect to the issue under consideration. States must
recognize that an MNE's control over its affiliates should be reflected
in the treatment of these local members of the MNE, which occasionally will lead to treatment different from that accorded to local
unrelated corporations. For example, tax authorities may interfere
432. See text accompanying notes 291-300 supra.
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with the MNE's transfer price decisions in order to protect the
national revenue. 433 Similarly, restrictive arrangements by foreign
units of the MNE that affect local competition may be prohibited,484
while at the same time common control over affiliates may justify
approval of other intercompany restrictive arrangements that otherwise would be prohibited.435 Third, different criteria may be established for corporate "nationality" depending on the legal issues
involved, in order to apply national policies to the proper segment
of the MNE. 436
National laws and regulations addressed to MNEs will inevitably
.produce implications extending beyond national boundaries that
will clash with the directives or policies of other sovereign states. As
a result, MNEs may be caught between contradictory policies of two
or more nations. Conversely, MNEs might avoid effective legal regulation if they were to discover loopholes arising from the lack of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination in a given area. States
must, therefore, cooperate with each other in reaching common understandings and international agreements to relieve tension in areas
such as taxation of the MNE-particularly in regard to intercompany
transactions,437 conflicting antitrust policies,438 trading with the
433. See notes 307, 317-18 8c 329 supra and accompanying text.
434. See notes 348-68 supra and accompanying text.
435. See text accompanying notes 330-36 supra.
436. The criteria of corporate nationality will be considered in greater depth in the
second Article.
437. Tax treaties should be adapted to the MNE to include rules for allocating and
adjusting income as well as more satisfactory mutual agreement procedures.
438. Currently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) plays the major role in relieving the tension of international antitrust frictions.
Its Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices is comprised of government
experts from the member states. This group exchanges antitrust information, helps
to develop national laws, and has initiated the multivolume GumE TO WORLD LEcISLA·
TION OF R.EsnuCTIVE BUSINESS PRAcnCES. See J. Rahl, supra note 349, at 454-59. The
current procedure was adopted in October 1967 by a Recommendation of the Council
of the OECD Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. (C)(67)53 (Final), in
J. Rahl, at 456-57. Under the procedure, a country has to notify other member states
of any antitrust investigation or proceeding involving important interests of these
members. Such a notification gives an opportunity to consider the view of the other
members prior to any unilateral act, para. l(a). The procedure provides for exchanges
of information among the members insofar as "their laws and legitimate interests
permit them to disclose," para. 2.
The cooperative procedure developed by the OECD was spurred by the effective
procedure in international antitrust between the United States and Canada. The
latter cooperation emerged out of the Canadian-United States consultations with
respect to the Canadian Electronic Patents case. United States v. General Elec. Co.,
Civil No. 140-157 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 24, 1958), settled by a consent decree, 1962 Trade
Cas. ,r 70,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The same consent decrees were entered against Westinghouse, 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) and Philips, 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,342
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enemy acts, export control regulations, securities laws, foreign investment laws, and to promote proper corporate behavior and responsibilities toward the states in which the MNE operates. Each field of
law can be the subject of a separate arrangement, since it would be
difficult if not impossible to develop a single arrangement capable of
covering most of these issues. 439 In addition to the attempts to reach
international agreements in each area of conflict and friction, efforts
should be made to establish an international forum that will allow
MNEs and the competent authorities of the states to discuss the areas
of conflict in order to encourage mutual understanding and to work
out a procedure to solve actual conflicts.440 Until international agreements of mutual understandings are concluded, the states should
individually exercise their legislative powers cautiously, in order to
avoid international conflicts with or discrimination against multinational business.441
At this point in time there is no pressing need for a supranational
corporation law under the direction of an international institution,442
except perhaps in regional markets such as the European Common
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). In 1959, Canada's Minister of Justice and Attorney General, David
Fulton, and his United States counterpart, \\Tilliam Rogers, arrived at an informal agreement, called the Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure, de•
signed to eliminate friction and to encourage common understanding of antitrust
problems affecting the two countries. Hearings on Intemational Aspects of Antitrust
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1966). The procedure has been strengthened by
a later Joint Statement, issued in November 1969, by the Canadian Minister Ron
Basford and the United States Attorney General, John Mitchell. U.S. Dept. of Justice
Press Release, Nov. 3, 1969 (mimeo). See J. Rahl, supra, at 447-48. The procedure provides for notification of antitrust proceedings affecting the other country, a consultation
procedure, exchange of information of "activities or situations" affecting international
trade, and, whenever possible, coordination of the enforcement of antitrust laws.
439. Thus, the proposal of an international mechanism similar to GATT applicable
to all MNEs would not be feasible at this stage. See, e.g., Goldberg &: Kindleberger,
supra note 2, advocating such a procedure for international investment. Cf. Rubin,
supra note 2, disagreeing with the idea of a GATT for investment but going too far
in rejecting the need for separate international arrangements in some of the areas of
conflict.
440. The current procedure concerning international antitrust conflicts between the
United States and Canada under the mutual agreement procedure under bilateral
ta.x treaties may serve as a starting point. See Hadari, supra note 179, at 134-35,
for a discussion of agreement through tax treaties.
441. An example of a unilateral exemption designed to facilitate international
business is the SEC regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1972), which exempts certain
securities issued by foreign issuers from the disclosure requirements of section 12g of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78l(g) (1970), to the extent that disclosure
of the information in question is not required or disclosed by the issuer in his country.
See Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study in the
Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 358 (1969).
442. See, e.g., Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 CoLUM. J.
WoRLD Bus., Nov.•Dec. 1967, at 25.
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Market. Most MNEs are not in fact truly multinational,443 but rather
are still identified with their home countries; it is not anticipated
that such enterprises are ready to incorporate internationally. Moreover, the conflict among corporation laws on the international level
has not reached the stage at which multinational investments are
significantly impeded. Consequently, states have not yet moved to
reach an innovative multinational agreement, since it is not yet a
priority item. If, however, the European company proposal is effectuated successfully, it may provide a new stimulant to the concept of
a world company. Future developments in the European Common
Market should be monitored carefully, especially with the admission
of the United Kingdom and Ireland, which may lead to greater harmonization of civil and common law.
443. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.

